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INTRODUCTION
In this symposium, we are spending a day exploring the intersection of tax,
gender, and sexuality. When the prominent critical race theorist Kimberle
Crenshaw coined the term “intersectionality” more than twenty years ago, it
appears that she had the metaphor of a crossroads in mind. Indeed, when
describing how Black women are multiply disadvantaged by a combination of
their gender and race, Crenshaw specifically drew upon this metaphor to make
her point:
Consider an analogy to traffic in an intersection, coming and going in
all four directions. Discrimination, like traffic through an intersection,
may flow in one direction, and it may flow in another. If an accident
happens in an intersection, it can be caused by cars traveling from any
number of directions and, sometimes, from all of them. Similarly, if a
Black woman is harmed because she is in the intersection, her injury
could result from sex discrimination or race discrimination.1
In speaking of potential accidents that may occur at an intersection, Crenshaw
highlights the violence inherent in all intersections. But, well before intersecting
paths give rise to the possibility that individuals, vehicles, or even concepts
traveling down these different paths might collide with each other, every
intersection has always already been the product of an originary, violent collision
of the paths themselves.
A trace—really, much more than a trace—of this originary violence can be
found in the etymological roots of the word “intersection” itself. The verb “to
intersect,” of which “intersection” is the noun form, comes from the Latin
intersecare, “to cut asunder, intersect.”2 Given the first of these two original
meanings, it should come as little surprise that this Latin word is actually a
combination of inter, “between,” and secare, “to cut.”3 Thus, it might be said that
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intersecting paths do not merely (and harmlessly) cross each other; rather, of
necessity, the two paths cut into each other to form or create a crossroads before
continuing on their way. Intersectional violence, therefore, long pre-dates any
potential collision that may occur at a crossroads, once created. A slash, a cleft, a
gash—some sort of mark or scar—was, whether freshly made or created long
ago, always already left by the cutting that was required to create the intersection
that gave rise to the opportunity for yet further, future violent convergences
between those traveling down the now intersecting paths.
In the case of the intersection of tax with sexual and gender identity, the
originary intersectional violence is still ongoing. In other words, the intersection
of tax with sexual and gender identity is still in the process of being created. The
two paths are colliding, cutting into each other, leaving a freshly open wound that
is bleeding and oozing and that still has not had time yet to heal into a scar
marking this intersectional point.
In this essay, I explore the violent collision of these concepts—or, more
appropriately, these two “others.” I begin my exploration of this collision of
“others” by first explaining how the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
(LGBT) community is a marginalized “other” in American society while, in
contrast, tax is a privileged “other” in the realm of American law. Then, I turn to a
close examination of a recent case, O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner,4 to illustrate
the collision of the otherness of LGBT individuals with the otherness of tax. This
case exemplifies the originary violence that is, as we speak, hewing the concepts
of tax and sexual and gender identity to create a point of intersection at which
these concepts can, in the future, again and again violently collide with each
other.
As Jacques Derrida has said, “Tout autre est tout autre.”5 Though much of the
magical quality of the phrase is lost in translation, this phrase has been rendered
in English as “Every other is completely other,”6 or, alternatively (and far more
cumbersomely), “Every other (one) is every (bit) other.”7 However translated,
Derrida has, with his characteristic obliqueness, said of this phrase:
“Every other (one) is every (bit) other”—the stakes seem to be altered
by the trembling of this dictum. It is no doubt too economical, too
elliptical, and hence, like any formula so isolated and capable of being
transmitted out of context, too close to the coded language of a
4. 134 T.C. 34 (2010).
5. JACQUES DERRIDA, THE GIFT OF DEATH 82 (David Wills trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1995)
[hereinafter DERRIDA, GIFT OF DEATH]. This is the title of a chapter of this book, in which Derrida
contemplates the alterity both of God and every other person. Later, in the course of a meditation on death
and the passage of borders (i.e., on what can be conceptualized as another intersection that can be fraught
with violence), Derrida repeats the phrase in speaking of the singularity of each person’s death. JACQUES
DERRIDA, APORIAS 22 (Thomas Dutoit trans., Stanford Univ. Press 1993) [hereinafter DERRIDA, APORIAS].
6. DERRIDA, APORIAS, supra note 5, at 22.
7. DERRIDA, GIFT OF DEATH, supra note 5, at 82.
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password. One uses it to play with the rules, to cut someone or
something short, to aggressively circumscribe a domain of discourse. It
becomes the secret of all secrets. Is it not sufficient to transform what
one complacently calls a context in order to demystify the shibboleth or
decipher all the secrets of the world?8
As Derrida suggests, let us take the next short while “to play with the rules,” “to
cut someone or something short,” and, even possibly, “to aggressively circum-
scribe a domain of discourse.”9 Let us transform our context by exploring how
tax, on the one hand, and sexual and gender identity, on the other, are so
“completely”10 or “every (bit) other.”11 Let us consider how, despite being so
distinctly different, the two concepts do share their difference in common. Let us
bear witness as, notwithstanding (or, perhaps, because of) their common outsider
status, these two concepts emerge as so profoundly and violently incompatible.12
I. OTHERNESS
A. TOUT AUTRE . . .
To say that lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, and transgender persons, who
collectively form the LGBT community, are treated in American society “as an
undifferentiated ‘other’ that can be marginalized, demonized, stigmatized, or just
forgotten” is to state the obvious.13 Nonetheless, it is worth recalling that the
“otherness” of the LGBT community is deeply ingrained in our culture. As
Professor Byrne Fone has documented in his book Homophobia: A History,14
Western society has a long-standing tradition of sexual prejudice.15
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. DERRIDA, APORIAS, supra note 5, at 22.
11. DERRIDA, GIFT OF DEATH, supra note 5, at 82.
12. See id. at 83.
We are not just playing here, turning this little sentence around in order to make it dazzle from
every angle. We would only pay slight and bemused attention to this particular formula and to
the form of this key if, in the discreet displacement that affects the functions of the two words
there didn’t appear, as if on the same musical scale, two alarmingly different themes
[partitions, (musical) scores] that, through their disturbing likeness, emerge as incompatible.
Id.
13. ANTHONY C. INFANTI, EVERYDAY LAW FOR GAYS AND LESBIANS (AND THOSE WHO CARE ABOUT
THEM) 16 (2007).
14. BYRNE FONE, HOMOPHOBIA: A HISTORY (2000).
15. As I have explained elsewhere:
The word “homophobia” was coined by the psychologist George Weinberg in the late 1960s.
This term has proven to be an effective rhetorical device for lesbians and gay men because it
stands “a central assumption of heterosexual society on its head by locating the ‘problem’ of
homosexuality not in homosexual people, but in heterosexuals who were intolerant of gay men
and lesbians.” Notwithstanding both its rhetorical power and its usefulness in drawing attention
to antigay hostility, scholars and psychologists have criticized the term because of its
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Professor Fone traces the roots of Western sexual prejudice to the partial
acceptance of homosexuality in Greece and Rome.16 By the end of Antiquity,
even this limited acceptance of homosexuality eroded and was replaced with
prohibitions on homosexual activity that eventually included the death penalty as
punishment.17 Civil and ecclesiastical attempts to control homosexual activity
increased “and homosexual acts generally came to be viewed as ‘heinous and
occasionally [were] described as the worst of all sins.’”18 “By the late Middle
Ages, sodomy was no longer a sin that could be repented; it had become a sin
without forgiveness. In the early thirteenth century, the Catholic Church called
for civil (as well as ecclesiastical) punishment of sodomy.”19 Though the full
extent to which homosexual activity was persecuted during this time still remains
unknown—after all, “sodomy was considered such a horrible crime that the
records of sodomy trials ‘were sometimes burned with the guilty sodomite’”20—
records of executions for sodomy date back as far as 1292.21
The Renaissance was little better, as sodomy was criminalized throughout
Europe and truly horrific punishments for homosexual acts were enacted,
including castration and death by decapitation, hanging, or burning.22 During this
period, “nearly sixteen thousand people were tried for sodomy . . . [and] about
four hundred men and women are known to have been executed” in Spain,
imprecision and ability to mislead. To remedy these problems, research psychologist Gregory
Herek has broken antigay hostility down into three different categories: sexual stigma (i.e., “the
shared knowledge of society’s negative regard for any nonheterosexual behavior, identity,
relationship or community”), heterosexism (i.e., “the cultural ideology that perpetuates sexual
stigma by denying and denigrating any nonheterosexual form of behavior, identity, relation-
ship, or community”), and sexual prejudice (i.e., “heterosexuals’ negative attitudes toward
homosexual behavior; people who engage in homosexual behavior or who identify as gay,
lesbian, or bisexual; and communities of gay, lesbian, and bisexual people”).
INFANTI, supra note 13, at 21-22 n.30 (quoting Gregory M. Herek, Beyond “Homophobia”: Thinking
About Sexual Prejudice and Stigma in the Twenty-first Century, 1 SEXUALITY RES. & SOC. POL’Y 6, 8,
15-17 (2004) (citations omitted)). Given these critiques, I generally avoid the term “homophobia” except
where another author has used it, opting instead for one of Herek’s more precise terms. Id.
16. As I have summarized elsewhere:
In retrospect, Greece is often viewed “as a utopia in which homosexual love flourished without
blame or censure”; however, Fone notes that the only homosexual activity accepted in ancient
Greek society was that which conformed to, and reinforced, the primacy of the adult male
citizen. Accordingly, “the adult male had the unquestioned right to penetrate and dominate his
presumably weaker, usually younger, and socially inferior partner,” who might be a younger
man but not an underage boy. In contrast, it was not socially acceptable for an adult male to be
effeminate, to accept the passive role in homosexual sex, or to engage exclusively in
homosexual sex. Similar conventions prevailed in Roman society.
Id. at 10 (quoting FONE, supra note 14, at 17, 26-27).
17. See FONE, supra note 14, at 60-71.
18. INFANTI, supra note 13, at 10 (quoting FONE, supra note 14, at 131 (footnote omitted)).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 10-11 (quoting FONE, supra note 14, at 174-75).
21. See FONE, supra note 14, at 144, 174.
22. See id. at 192-225.
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Portugal, France, Italy, and Geneva alone.23 “By the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, many Western European nations had decriminalized
sodomy; however, this decriminalization ‘did not mean that intolerance of
sodomites also disappeared.’”24 Still, England resisted the trend toward decrimi-
nalization. It retained “the death penalty for sodomy until 1861 and criminal
sanctions for homosexual activity into the twentieth century.”25
Shifting from the Old to the New World, sodomy was punishable by death
during the colonial period in New England.26 There are records of men being
executed as well as records of men being severely whipped, burned with a hot
iron, and then made permanent outcasts for engaging in homosexual activity.27
Like England, the United States ignored the trend toward decriminalization.
Many states abolished the death penalty for homosexual activity but retained
their criminal prohibitions of sodomy, in some cases into the twenty-first
century.28
Focusing more particularly on the status of members of the LGBT community
as outlaws in the United States, Professor William Eskridge has published a
series of law review articles documenting “the history of the legal treatment of
homosexuality in the United States from the late nineteenth century through the
early 1980s.”29 In late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century America, arrests
and convictions for “crimes against nature” rose, as did the use of other laws
(e.g., those relating to disorderly conduct, vagrancy, loitering, indecent exposure,
and solicitation) to regulate same-sex “degeneracy.”30 Professor Eskridge
describes the chilling practical effects of this regulation of homosexual activity:
More important, the consequences of arrest and more certain convic-
tion of crimes associated with homosexuality often had tragic collateral
consequences: jail time (several years if convicted of sodomy),
incarceration and physical torture in a mental institution under a sexual
psychopath law, loss of one’s job and even livelihood if the arrest were
publicized, court-martial or (more typically) administrative separation
23. Id. at 214.
24. INFANTI, supra note 13, at 11 (quoting FONE, supra note 14, at 266).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 329.
27. Id. at 329, 331.
28. Id. at 332; see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down the remaining state sodomy
laws).
29. INFANTI, supra note 13, at 11; see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Law and the Construction of the Closet:
American Regulation of Same-Sex Intimacy, 1880–1946, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1007 (1997); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Privacy Jurisprudence and the Apartheid of the Closet, 1946–1961, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
703 (1997); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet: Establishing Conditions
for Lesbian and Gay Intimacy, Nomos, and Citizenship, 1961–1981, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 817 (1997). The
following summary of these articles is borrowed from INFANTI, supra note 13, at 11-12, with original
footnotes renumbered to correspond to the numbering in this essay and other footnotes added in keeping
with law review convention.
30. Eskridge, Law and Construction of the Closet, supra note 29, at 1016-17, 1032.
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from the armed forces, deportation if one were a noncitizen, and
continued surveillance and harassment by police officers and detec-
tives. The homosexual was not only a sexual outlaw, but one who by
World War II had clearly caught the eye of the government.31
Tracking the medical discourse of the period, American social understanding
of homosexual activity shifted from “the sinful sodomite to the degenerate
invert . . . [and then] from the degenerate invert to the psychopathic homo-
sexual.”32 Although the invert was considered a threat for challenging traditional
gender roles (an invert might today be called gender nonconforming or a “gender
bender”), the psychopathic homosexual was considered even more of a threat
because he “was sexually out of control and even predatory” (think of the now
well-worn stereotype of the homosexual as child molester).33 In view of the
threat to society posed by homosexuality, the government sought to “expunge
homosexuality from the nation’s public culture . . . [through] censorship of
homophile publications, theatrical productions, and movies that depicted ‘sex
perversion’; disruption of homosexual socialization by state raids on homosexual
haunts and by regulation of liquor sales; and finally direct interrogation,
treatment, and exclusion during World War II.”34
In the postwar years, homosexuals were the object of witch hunts at the federal
and state levels. As antihomosexual panics swept cities from Boise, Idaho, to
Miami, Florida, vice squads vigorously pursued homosexuals through spying,
decoys, and raids.35 In addition, an increasing number of states enacted sexual
psychopath laws that permitted indefinite detention and psychiatric treatment of
homosexuals—treatment that included lobotomies, electric shock aversion
therapy, pharmacological shock (induced vomiting when homoerotic images
were shown), and the injection of hormones.36 At the same time, the federal
government attempted to eliminate homosexuals from civil service employment
and military service, and it further attempted to exclude alien homosexuals from
entering the United States.37 These federal witch hunts had a broader impact
because the government shared information with private employers, who often
blacklisted individuals discharged for being homosexual.38 Whether on their own
or cued by the federal government, the states also began witch hunts for
homosexuals.39
In the 1940s and 1950s, the federal government surveilled and harassed both
31. Id. at 1068-69 (footnote omitted).
32. Id. at 1054.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1069.
35. Eskridge, Privacy Jurisprudence, supra note 29, at 717-33.
36. Id. at 713-16.
37. Id. at 733-46.
38. Id. at 743.
39. Id. at 746.
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individual homosexuals and homosexual organizations, and state and local
governments attempted to suppress homosexual socialization by raiding gay bars
and revoking their liquor licenses.40 During this period, the federal and state
governments also censored homosexual publications. Films were subjected to
several layers of censorship: The federal government impounded foreign films
dealing with homosexuality, the motion-picture industry adopted a voluntary
censorship code that prohibited reference to homosexuality in films distributed
domestically, and state and local licensing laws prohibited films dealing with
homosexuality.41
This barrage of police persecution, government employment discrimination,
exclusion of homosexual aliens, suppression of homosexual socialization, and
censorship of homosexual materials did not abate until the 1960s and 1970s.42
Notwithstanding that the LGBT movement gathered steam following the
Stonewall uprising in 196943 and began to make remarkable strides,44 the LGBT
community continued (and continues) to be marginalized and stigmatized. For
example, it was not until 2003 that the U.S. Supreme Court finally struck down
the last of the state criminal prohibitions against consensual homosexual sex.45
Anti-LGBT bias crimes continue to occur at high rates—and transgender and
other gender nonconforming persons find themselves disproportionately tar-
geted.46 Moreover, the LGBT community is still seen “as some disembodied and
dehumanized ‘other’ that can be vilified and scapegoated for society’s prob-
lems.”47 In the past decade alone, the LGBT community has found itself blamed
for (1) natural disasters, as it was in the wake of Hurricane Katrina;48 (2) the
40. Id. at 754-57, 761-66.
41. Id. at 757-61.
42. See generally Eskridge, Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet, supra note 29.
43. Elizabeth Armstrong has provocatively challenged the conventional wisdom that the 1969
Stonewall uprising was the catalyst for gay liberation. ELIZABETH A. ARMSTRONG, FORGING GAY
IDENTITIES: ORGANIZING SEXUALITY IN SAN FRANCISCO, 1950-1994, at 56-80 (2002).
44. For a description both of how far the LGBT movement has come over the past several decades and
of how far it still has to go to achieve equality and acceptance, see INFANTI, supra note 13, at 2-7.
45. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
46. NAT’L COAL. OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, HATE VIOLENCE AGAINST THE LESBIAN, GAY,
BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND QUEER COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2009, at 4-5, 17 (2010),
available at http://www.avp.org/documents/NCAVP2009HateViolenceReportforWeb_000.pdf (explain-
ing that a decline in reported incidents in 2009 was likely due not to an actual decrease in incidents but to
the effects of the economic downturn on the ability of agencies to obtain data and further explaining that
transgender and other gender nonconforming persons “are particularly vulnerable to hate violence”). The
number of anti-LGBT murders in 2009—even though lower than the number in 2008—was still the
second highest number reported during the preceding ten years. Id. at 29.
47. INFANTI, supra note 13, at 8.
48. Tom Zeller, Jr., To Some, Katrina Was Mission Accomplished, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2005, at C3
(“For others, the storm was simply a divine gay-bashing, with numerous Web sites taking it as no
coincidence that Katrina landed just two days before the start of Southern Decadence 2005, the annual
New Orleans celebration known informally as the Gay Mardi Gras.”).
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September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks;49 and (3) John Kerry’s loss in the 2004
presidential election.50 And the seemingly incessant bullying and bashing of
LGBT others can have very real—and very tragic—consequences, as we
witnessed in the spate of suicides by gay teens in fall 2010.51
B. . . . ET TOUT AUTRE
Tax, too, is an “other”—but in a different, generally more positive sense of that
word. That is, tax is not “other” in the sense of being outside, lesser, or
marginalized; rather, it is “other” in the sense of being a unique and different area
of the law, and often one that is seen as elevated, above the fray, or somehow on a
higher plane. Put differently, tax is, as it is sometimes said, “exceptional.” Tax
exceptionalism manifests itself in a variety of different ways and contexts. In this
section, I sketch a few examples of arguments and counterarguments about the
position that tax occupies in the realm of American law to provide a sense of the
pervasiveness of the notion of tax exceptionalism.
1. Legislative History
A trio of tax practitioners (one of whom had earlier been—and later was
again—a Treasury official) has argued that the tax legislative process is
sufficiently different from the process of creating legislation in other areas that
tax legislative history should (subject to a few qualifications) be treated as an
authoritative source of guidance concerning congressional intent.52 Recognizing
that tax lawyers widely hold this view, Professor Karla Simon has argued that the
tax legislative process is actually not all that unique and argues for a slightly
49. John F. Harris, God Gave U.S. “What We Deserve,” Falwell Says, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2001, at
C3 (“Television evangelists Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson, two of the most prominent voices of the
religious right, said liberal civil liberties groups, feminists, homosexuals and abortion rights supporters
bear partial responsibility for Tuesday’s terrorist attacks because their actions have turned God’s anger
against America.”).
50. Scott S. Greenberger, Gay-Marriage Ruling Pushed Voters Mobilized Bush, Left Kerry Wary,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 7, 2004, at B1 (“In the days after Tuesday’s elections, conservative activists and
some Democrats are increasingly pointing to the Supreme Judicial Court’s decision that legalized gay
marriage in Massachusetts, along with the images of gay weddings in San Francisco, as a key reason for
Kerry’s loss. President Bush hammered home the portrayal of Democrats as out of step with mainstream
values by endorsing a federal amendment to same-sex marriage [sic] and by often reminding crowds that
Kerry was from Massachusetts, a subtle code, in the eyes of some strategists.”).
51. See Jesse McKinley, Several Recent Suicides Put Light on Pressures Facing Gay Teenagers, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 4, 2010, at A9.
52. Bradford L. Ferguson et al., Reexamining the Nature and Role of Tax Legislative History in Light
of the Changing Realities of the Process, 67 TAXES 804 (1989); Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S.
Dep’t of Treasury, Donald C. Lubick Confirmed as Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy (Feb. 13,
1998), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/rr2225.htm. As Paul Caron has observed, “[s]ome tax cases
appear to place greater emphasis on the legislative history than on the statutory language. Judge Hall of
the Tax Court has complained that ‘[i]t has been said, with more than a grain of truth, that judges in tax
cases these days tend to consult the statute only when the legislative history is ambiguous.’” Paul L.
Caron, Tax Myopia, Or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow up to Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517,
532-33 (1994) (quoting Focht v. Comm’r, 68 T.C. 223, 244 (1977) (Hall, J., dissenting)).
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tempered version of the generally accepted treatment of tax legislative history in
the interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code (Code).53 Professor Paul Caron
has agreed with Professor Simon, referring to the exceptionalism of the tax
legislative process as a “myth.”54 Though he came to no firm conclusion
regarding the role that legislative history should play in the interpretation of the
tax laws, Professor Caron did call for a greater integration of tax and nontax
thinking regarding the role of legislative history in statutory interpretation.55
2. Statutory Interpretation
In a similar interpretational vein, Professor Lawrence Zelenak has considered
when statutes—and, more particularly, the Code, given its “unique complexity”—
merit nonliteral interpretation.56 In the course of his discussion of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s “serious lack of consistency”57 in adopting literal versus
nonliteral interpretations of the Code, Professor Zelenak posed and then
answered the following interesting question:
Why, then, if most of the express pronouncements advocate either strict
construction in favor of the taxpayer or an evenhanded approach
favoring neither party, do courts in practice seem to be more willing to
adopt nonliteral interpretations at the government’s request than at
taxpayers’ request? The answer seems to be that over the decades, the
courts have come to view themselves as having a special duty to act as
guardians of the fisc by closing loopholes that Congress inadvertently
left open. Although there is a long history of judicial willingness to
protect the fisc from Congress’ sloppy drafting, there is no correspond-
ing history of judicial willingness to protect taxpayers from Congress’
mistakes. The result is that the government is more likely than a
taxpayer to succeed in persuading a court to adopt a nonliteral
interpretation.58
More recently, Professor Mary Heen has maintained that the Court’s on-again,
off-again adoption of a “plain meaning” approach to statutory interpretation
“poses special dangers for tax law because of the rich range of contextual and
policy considerations that inform the Internal Revenue Code.”59 Using the
example of a series of cases interpreting § 104(a)(2), Professor Heen argued that
53. Karla W. Simon, Constitutional Implications of the Tax Legislative Process, 10 AM. J. TAX POL’Y
235, 236, 237-44, 256-57 (1992).
54. Caron, supra note 52, at 531.
55. Id. at 531-54.
56. Lawrence Zelenak, Thinking About Nonliteral Interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code, 64
N.C. L. REV. 623, 630 (1986).
57. Id. at 674.
58. Id. at 667 (footnote omitted).
59. Mary L. Heen, Plain Meaning, the Tax Code, and Doctrinal Incoherence, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 771,
771 (1997).
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inconsistent application of this approach to statutory interpretation not only risks
“piecemeal and incoherent interpretations” of the statute,60 but also can have an
impact on the level of deference that the Supreme Court affords to the Treasury
Department’s interpretation of the tax laws.61
3. Deference to Agency Interpretation
On this question of deference to agency interpretation (and echoing his
discussion of the use of legislative history in the interpretation of the tax laws),62
Professor Caron has suggested that we put the myth of tax exceptionalism behind
us and move toward a synergistic approach regarding the level of judicial
deference to Treasury Department interpretations of the Code.63 Professor Kristin
Hickman has likewise bemoaned the role of tax exceptionalism in discussions of
the level of deference that courts should afford to Treasury regulations:
Yet the emphasis of the existing scholarship on the uniqueness of the
tax field—and the resulting complexity that this focus has added to
what otherwise should be a fairly simple analysis—are emblematic of a
perception of tax exceptionalism that intrudes upon much contempo-
rary tax scholarship and jurisprudence. The view that tax is different or
special creates, among other problems, a cloistering effect that too
often leads practitioners, scholars, and courts considering tax issues to
misconstrue or disregard otherwise interesting and relevant develop-
ments in non-tax areas, even when the questions involved are not
particularly unique to tax. The ongoing debate over judicial deference
toward tax regulations offers an especially frustrating example of this
tax exceptionalism at work.64
More recently, in undertaking a preliminary articulation of a theory of regulatory
regimes that are better explained by their history and context than by statutory
language, Professor Hickman, writing with Professor Claire Hill, purposefully
left the door open to the possibility that tax may actually be exceptional.65
Nonetheless, in an even more recent Internet posting, Professor Hickman
concluded that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo Foundation for
60. Id. at 812.
61. Id. at 820.
62. See supra text accompanying note 55.
63. Caron, supra note 52, at 554-73; accord Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, Discarded Deference:
Judicial Independence in Informal Agency Guidance, 74 TENN. L. REV. 1, 34 (2006) (contending that tax
should not have its own deference tradition and further maintaining that other areas of administrative law
could borrow from tax in developing an appropriate level of deference for informal agency guidance).
64. Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90
MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1541 (2006).
65. Kristin E. Hickman & Claire A. Hill, Concepts, Categories, and Compliance in the Regulatory
State, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1151, 1157-58 (2010).
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Medical Education & Research v. United States66 has finally sounded the death
knell for tax exceptionalism with regard to deference to agency interpretations of
statutes.67
4. Comprehensive Tax Base and Tax Expenditures
Other commentators critique those who advocate the use of a comprehensive
tax base—and, implicitly, tax expenditure analysis—on tax exceptionalism
grounds. Professors David Weisbach and Jacob Nussim have put this critique in
colorful terms:
As far as we can tell, the only way one can make the arguments made
by CTB [comprehensive tax base] advocates is to treat the tax system
as separate from the rest of the government. Under this view, ensuring
the efficiency and fairness of the tax system, taken alone, should be the
goal of tax reformers. This produces the odd result that removing a
program from the tax system and replacing it with an identical program
implemented by another agency produces an efficiency and fairness
gain, notwithstanding that no behavior has changed and no policy has
been altered. Kyle Logue has called this view “tax-exceptionalism.”
Another name might be NIMBY, or Not In My Back Yard. CTB
advocates want their backyard to be clean but don’t seem to care about
where else the trash might be put.68
The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) considers this critique to be leveled
equally at tax expenditure analysis.69 Interpreting the critique in this way, the JCT
forcefully responded to the critique, no matter its target:
There also is merit to the argument that tax expenditure analysis
reflects tax “exceptionalism”—the belief that the tax system ordinarily
ought not to be burdened with the sort of ad hoc political compromises
reflected on the face of much spending legislation. In the view of the
JCT Staff, however, that “exceptionalism” is largely justified.
66. 131 S. Ct. 704, 713-14 (2011) (declining to apply a less deferential standard of review to tax
regulations than is applied to other regulations).
67. Kristin Hickman, Goodbye National Muffler! Hello Administrative Law?, TAXPROF BLOG (Jan. 11,
2011), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2011/01/hickman-.html.
68. David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 YALE
L.J. 955, 968-69 (2004) (quoting Kyle D. Logue, If Taxpayers Can’t Be Fooled, Maybe Congress Can: A
Public Choice Perspective on the Tax Transition Debate, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1507, 1524 (2000)
(reviewing DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF
TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY (2000)).
69. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PUB. NO. JCX-37-08, A RECONSIDERATION OF TAX
EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 35 (2008); see J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Can Tax Expenditure
Analysis Be Divorced from a Normative Tax Base?: A Critique of the “New Paradigm” and Its
Denouement, 30 VA. TAX REV. 135, 174 (2010) (addressing the Joint Committee on Taxation’s discussion
of the tax exceptionalism argument).
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Unlike most spending programs, the tax system affects every
individual and every economic transaction. The same is not true of
most spending legislation. Because virtually every adult American
must wrestle with the Internal Revenue Code, and because our system
ultimately relies on self-assessment, it is important to reduce the
compliance burden and to reinforce the view that the tax system is
equitable. A taxpayer who reads 87 pages of instructions for a tax return
that detail a host of special exemptions, credits, and deductions incurs
substantial compliance costs (in time or money), and may come away
from the experience with the belief that the tax system contains
numerous special provisions that are available to others, but not to him.
Both the mistakes that may result and the perception of a system
riddled with special provisions undercut in an important way the
success of the self-assessment system. For these reasons, the JCT Staff
believes that there is merit in a presumption in favor of a tax system
that is as simple and as easy to administer as possible.70
Professor Michael Graetz has come at the question of the tax exceptionalism in
tax expenditures from a slightly different angle. He has referred to “our
unique—[he] would insist excessive—reliance on the use of income tax
expenditures as a favored mechanism to address our nation’s most pressing
economic and social problems” as a form of “tax policy exceptionalism.”71
Graetz asserts that our excessive reliance on tax expenditures is “a luxury that we
can no longer afford.”72
5. Tax Collection
Prior to the enactment of the collections due process provisions of the Internal
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, this exceptionalism also
extended to the deference given to the Internal Revenue Service in the collection
of taxes.73 As Professor Leslie Book has explained:
[T]ax adjudications are not part of the administrative law landscape.
Tax adjudications stand alone. This isolation is explained largely by
historical practice, a practice that, with respect to the exemption of
collection determinations from judicial review, stems from a belief that
the government interest in tax adjudication is so vital that it warrants
special treatment and unbridled discretion.74
70. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 69, at 37; see Fleming & Peroni, supra note 69, at
174 (arguing that tax expenditure analysis does not embody exceptionalism at all).
71. Michael J. Graetz, Woodworth Memorial Lecture: Tax Policy Challenges, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1,
6 (2009).
72. Id.
73. Leslie Book, The Collection Due Process Rights: A Misstep or a Step in the Right Direction?, 41
HOUS. L. REV. 1145, 1148 (2004).
74. Id. at 1174-75 (footnote omitted).
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Professor Book further explained that the case law interpreting the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment was similarly marked by notions of tax
exceptionalism. “Although the last few decades of the twentieth century saw an
explosion of procedural developments designed to ensure that government
actions did not deprive an individual of property rights or privacy rights before
adequate notice and hearing, tax cases have remained outside the due process
mainstream.”75 Yet, as Professor Danshera Cords has observed, this tax
exceptionalism has persisted even after the enactment of the collections due
process provisions.76 Notwithstanding the potential for increased fairness and
efficiency in the tax collections process, the Tax Court has resisted applying
administrative law principles to its review of tax collections decisions (as well as
claims for innocent spouse relief and interest abatement) in the same way that the
federal district courts do in tax and other cases involving the review of agency
decision making.77
6. Specialized Court of Appeals
Given the specialized nature of tax disputes and the forum shopping permitted
in tax litigation, commentators—including judges, law school deans, and the
Federal Courts Study Committee—have been calling for the creation of a single,
specialist court to hear appeals in all tax cases since shortly after the inception of
the modern federal income tax.78 Most recently, in 1998, the Commission on
Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals suggested that, rather
than creating a separate, specialized tax court of appeals, Congress could simply
consolidate tax appeals in the Federal Circuit, which already hears appeals of tax
cases from the Court of Federal Claims.79 To date, these calls have gone
unheeded. Professor William Popkin has asserted that the crux of the opposition
to creating a specialized court of tax appeals actually stems from the likelihood
that the court would be exceptionally good at its job:
75. Id. at 1175-76.
76. Danshera Cords, Administrative Law and Judicial Review of Tax Collection Decisions, 52 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 429, 441 (2008).
Not all courts approaching new oversight role [sic] have done so in the same manner. The
district courts apply the APA and administrative law in tax collection cases. However, the Tax
Court has been slow to apply traditional abuse of discretion review and administrative law in
tax collection cases. This reluctance to apply administrative law is understandable in light of
the historical jurisdiction of the Tax Court, which was limited to cases that required de novo
trials. In addition, tax law is often treated as separate and different from other areas of the law.
Nevertheless, administrative law and its principles are applicable to most tax collection cases,
and conducting a de novo trial is inconsistent with abuse of discretion review.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
77. Id. at 445-48, 474-78.
78. Caron, supra note 52, at 581-87.
79. COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTS. FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT 73-74 (1998),
available at http://www.library.unt.edu/gpo/csafca/final/appstruc.pdf.
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A specialized court, confident of its expertise and of not being
contradicted by another appellate court, would feel more secure than
generalist courts in identifying the underlying statutory structure. The
appeal to statutory structure will often (though not inevitably) under-
mine the more or less clear text, thereby contributing to uncertainty.
Moreover, the statutory structure will often (though, again, not
inevitably) limit tax avoidance—for example, by requiring transactions
to have some prospect of economic profitability and by limiting the
deduction of outlays with a substantial personal consumption compo-
nent. In combination, the increase in uncertainty and application of
anti-tax avoidance principles by a Court of Tax Appeals is likely to tilt
the law more in favor of the government.80
7. Tax Lawyers
Tax lawyers themselves are said to feel special because of their mastery of the
tax laws:
[T]he Internal Revenue Code is so difficult to understand that those
who are not exceedingly familiar with the subject matter and the
Code’s special vocabulary will find it largely incomprehensible. Tax
lawyers themselves frequently boast about their trials in coping with
the complexity of the tax laws. Thus, complexity reinforces their sense
of separateness and superiority to others, who want nothing to do with
the statutory mess with which tax lawyers deal on a daily basis.81
The tax bar has even been referred to as a “special priesthood.”82 Indeed, despite
calling attention to what he sees as a generally negative perception of tax lawyers
outside of the tax bar (Tom Cruise’s character in The Firm notwithstanding),83
Professor Caron closes his widely cited article, Tax Myopia, Or Mamas Don’t Let
Your Babies Grow up to Be Tax Lawyers, by underscoring the “special” qualities
of tax lawyers:
[I]n performing their tax legislation, administration, and litigation
functions, the relevant players must resist the notion that they bring
nothing to the table other than their special tax expertise and
background. By replacing their narrow tax lens with a panoramic
perspective of the legal landscape, the tax debate will be invigorated
80. William D. Popkin, Why a Court of Tax Appeals Is So Elusive, 47 TAX NOTES 1101, 1104 (1990).
81. Simon, supra note 53, at 239.
82. Caron, supra note 52, at 526.
83. See id. at 519-31 (describing the less than positive perceptions of tax lawyers held by law students,
lawyers who practice outside of the tax area, and popular culture generally); id. at 589 (“Tax lawyers and
professors have only themselves to blame for the popular perception that Michael Tucker, and not Tom
Cruise is the prototypical tax lawyer.”).
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with nontax learning while the special talents of tax lawyers and
professors will generate insights useful to their nontax counterparts.84
8. Exceptional Areas Within Tax
Even within tax, there are some areas—for example, subchapter K with its
rules governing the taxation of partnerships—that are more rarefied, more
exceptional than others. In commenting on practitioners’ negative reactions to the
issuance of proposed regulations containing the partnership antiabuse rule, Tax
Notes columnist Lee Sheppard stated:
The partnership bar’s Weltanschaaung can be roughly summarized as
follows: A partnership is a magic circle. Anything that is dropped into it
becomes exempt from taxation. Forever. Any item that produces
income can be allocated to a partner with losses and vice versa; the
substantial economic effect rule of section 704(b) has been interpreted
to mean that partners have to promise to make it up sometime before
the millennium. Adherents to this view of subchapter K understand the
word “flexible” to mean that you can do absolutely anything you want
without incurring tax. Readers will recall that the partnership bar
collectively decided to ignore the Diamond decision because they did
not like the result.85
9. Above Politics
Finally, turning to the form of tax exceptionalism most directly relevant to this
essay, many see tax as an exceptional area of the law that should be above the fray
of the so-called culture wars. This form of tax exceptionalism most commonly
manifests itself in hostility to critical (e.g., feminist, critical race, and queer)
perspectives on the tax laws. This hostility was on full and open display in a 1998
symposium on critical tax theory in the North Carolina Law Review.86
Professor Lawrence Zelenak’s lead article for that symposium began by
welcoming the advent of feminist and critical race perspectives to tax because
they were “long overdue.”87 Nonetheless, he immediately confessed to being
“troubled that much of the work has not been carefully done.”88 Professor
84. Id. at 590 (emphasis added).
85. Lee A. Sheppard, Partnerships, Consolidated Returns, and Cognitive Dissonance, 63 TAX NOTES
936, 936 (1994); see id. (“Proposed reg section 1.701-2 is a restatement of existing law, despite the
partnership bar’s collective belief that general principles such as the doctrine of substance over form do
not apply to partnerships.”); Andrea Monroe, What’s in a Name: Can the Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule
Really Stop Partnership Tax Abuse?, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 401, 407 (2010) (“To many observers, the
[partnership antiabuse rule] seemed self-evident, but the Treasury feared that subchapter K’s unique
combination of flexibility, complexity, and low enforcement caused some taxpayers to believe that
partnerships were special and, thus, not subject to the tax system’s first principles.”).
86. See Symposium, Critical Tax Theory: Criticism and Response, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1519 (1998).
87. Lawrence Zelenak, Taking Critical Tax Theory Seriously, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1521, 1522 (1998).
88. Id. at 1523.
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Zelenak included among his list of common weaknesses in the literature “an
overeagerness to accuse the tax laws of hostility to women or blacks,” “selection
bias” (i.e., choosing to focus on only those provisions in the Code that support a
claim of bias), and a lack of intellectual rigor (i.e., “failure to think through
proposed solutions with sufficient care”).89 Professor Zelenak closed his article
by asserting that “problems of one-sidedness and incomplete analysis are more
common in the critical tax literature than in the general academic tax policy
literature.”90 He also maintained that critical tax theorists “do not approach the
tax laws in a detached and disinterested frame of mind” and essentially—not to
mention paradoxically—contended that the only legitimate means for finding
discrimination in the Code is to stumble upon it.91 In his contribution to the
symposium, Professor Steve Johnson similarly set an impossible—one might
even say exclusionary—bar for engaging in legitimate critical tax scholarship by
asserting that critical tax scholars can make no assertion of discrimination until
every single provision in the Code has been analyzed to determine whether a
group is disadvantaged on a net basis.92
Other contributors to the symposium issue were more forthright in expressing
their hostility to critical tax scholarship and in ostracizing those who would sully
our neutral, objective tax laws with the suggestion that they form part of a larger
legal framework of subordination. Seconding Professor Zelenak’s criticisms,
Professor Joseph Dodge essentially referred to critical tax scholars as a group of
“whiner[s].”93 Professor James Bryce bemoaned the advent of critical perspec-
tives to the tax academic literature and proclaimed its general pointlessness.94
Professor Charles Galvin made the case for tax exceptionalism most clearly:
A tax system should be neutral in its effect on each citizen’s
decisionmaking. Therefore, assuming a democratic ideal of a free
society with equal opportunity for all, the framers of tax policy should
strive for a system that is blind as to gender and color. I agree with
Professor Zelenak that any attempt to tailor the system to meet the
criticisms of feminists or racial groups rapidly becomes a nightmare of
dilemmas that are just not resolvable. One needs only to observe
lifestyles of friends, colleagues, neighbors, and relatives, and one
becomes keenly aware that to design a tax regime to meet the gender
and race considerations of each case would create a statutory maze of
confusion many times worse confounded than the current system.
89. Id. at 1523-24.
90. Id. at 1578.
91. Id. at 1578-79.
92. Steve R. Johnson, Targets Missed and Targets Hit: Critical Tax Studies and Effective Tax Reform,
76 N.C. L. REV. 1771, 1771-72 (1998).
93. Joseph M. Dodge, A Feminist Perspective on the QTIP Trust and the Unlimited Marital
Deduction, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1729, 1729 (1998).
94. James D. Bryce, A Critical Evaluation of the Tax Crits, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1687, 1687 (1998).
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Furthermore, trade-offs between different feminist goals make simple
solutions impossible. A better course is to achieve neutrality by the
attainment as nearly as possible of a pure Haig-Simons comprehensive
model or a pure consumed income model.95
Thus, according to Professor Galvin, tax should be deemed to exist on a higher,
idealized plane where there is no racism, sexism, or other prejudice and where
there is equal opportunity for all. In Professor Galvin’s utopia, we can best serve
all of our citizens by striving for nothing less than the theoretically perfect tax
system, whether in the form of an income or a consumption tax. It is simply too
much to ask our tax system to deal with mundane issues of discrimination and
subordination because “[t]o try to solve particular problems through the Internal
Revenue Code would present a daunting challenge no lawmaker should or could
take on.”96
The message here is that “other” areas of the law—and not tax—should be
asked to grapple with and redress issues of discrimination and subordination. Tax
is clearly “exceptional” and above being asked to do so.
II. FRESH WOUNDS
Even as we meet here today (perhaps especially so), the collision of these two
others—outsiders of distinctly different sorts, one privileged and one subordi-
nated—is carving out a point of intersection. Astonishingly, despite the surfeit of
tax issues faced by (and sometimes peculiar to) LGBT individuals,97 the
originary violence that is necessary to create a point where these two “others” can
and do intersect has only recently gotten under way.
Evidence of the fresh wounds inflicted by this originary violence is easily
found in the small amount of judicial and regulatory guidance that exists on
issues specific to LGBT taxpayers. As of this writing, the federal courts have
addressed the application of the tax laws to same-sex couples in just four
95. Charles O. Galvin, Taking Critical Tax Theory Seriously—A Comment, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1749,
1749 (1998).
96. Id. at 1752. Contra Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Equity, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1240 (2008) (“It also
seems disingenuous to argue that taking [critical tax] concerns into account is just too difficult, when we
tolerate mind-numbing levels of complexity in areas that benefit the wealthy.”).
97. See generally Patricia A. Cain, Death Taxes: A Critique from the Margin, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 677
(2000); Patricia A. Cain, Federal Tax Consequences of Civil Unions, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 387 (2002);
Patricia A. Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 805 (2008); Adam Chase, Tax Planning
for Same-Sex Couples, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 359 (1995); Anthony C. Infanti, Bringing Sexual Orientation
and Gender Identity into the Tax Classroom, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (2009); Anthony C. Infanti,
Deconstructing the Duty to the Tax System: Unfettering Zealous Advocacy on Behalf of Lesbian and Gay
Taxpayers, 61 TAX LAW. 407 (2008); Anthony C. Infanti, Dismembering Families, in CHALLENGING
GENDER INEQUALITY IN TAX POLICY MAKING: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 159 (Kimberley Brooks et al.,
eds. 2011); Anthony C. Infanti, The Internal Revenue Code as Sodomy Statute, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
763 (2004) [hereinafter Infanti, Sodomy Statute]; Nancy J. Knauer, Heteronormativity and Federal Tax
Policy, 101 W. VA. L. REV. 129 (1998).
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cases—all of which were decided between 2000 and 2010 (and two of which
were brought by the same taxpayer).98 In three of these cases, the taxpayer
resoundingly lost,99 but, in the fourth (and most recent) case, the taxpayer
won.100 Notably, however, that recent win was not in a purely tax case; instead,
tax was but one illustration of the effects of the federal Defense of Marriage Act
in a broader challenge of the constitutionality of that statute.101 The federal courts
have addressed the application of the tax laws to transgender individuals in just
one case,102 which was decided in 2010 and was largely a win for the
taxpayer—though, as more fully explained below, the victory rings hollow.103
Guidance from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has been similarly sparse
and conflicting. Since the early 1990s, the IRS has been issuing private letter
rulings regarding the tax treatment of an employer’s provision of health insurance
coverage for the domestic partners of its employees—though, this guidance is
just as pertinent for unmarried different-sex couples as it is for same-sex
couples.104 In fact, the earliest ruling addressed the tax treatment of health
insurance coverage offered by a city to “nonspouse cohabitants” of its employ-
ees—a category that it created to comply with a prohibition against discrimina-
tion on the basis of marital status, not sexual or gender identity.105
More directly applicable to same-sex couples, the IRS issued guidance for
California registered domestic partners after they began to be subject to the
state’s community property laws in 2005.106 Despite early pleas for such
guidance,107 it was not until the middle of the tax-filing season in 2006 that the
IRS’s Office of Chief Counsel issued a memorandum in which it opined that the
application of California’s community property laws to same-sex couples would
not be respected for federal tax purposes.108 With a change of administration,
98. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010); Merrill v. Comm’r, 98 T.C.M.
(CCH) 25 (2009); Mueller v. Comm’r, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 764 (2001), aff’d, 90 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5309
(7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1003 (2002); Mueller v. Comm’r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1887 (2000),
aff’d, 87 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2052 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 887 (2001). The federal
government promptly appealed the decision in Gill, and that appeal is still pending at the time of this
writing. Denise Lavoie, US Appeals Mass. Rulings on Gay Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 13, 2010, at 7.
99. Merrill, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 25; Mueller, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 764; Mueller, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1887.
100. Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d 374.
101. Id. at 376-77, 379-83; see 1 U.S.C. § 7 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-90).
102. O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34 (2010).
103. Anthony C. Infanti, Dissecting O’Donnabhain, 126 TAX NOTES 1403 (2010).
104. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-34-048 (May 29, 1990).
105. Id.; see also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-31-062 (May 7, 1992) (addressing the tax treatment of health
insurance coverage provided to registered domestic partners, which include any “two adults who live
together and who have agreed to be jointly responsible for basic living expenses incurred during the
domestic partnership”); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-09-060 (Dec. 6, 1990) (addressing the tax treatment of
health insurance coverage provided to “Principal Domestic Partners,” which was “defined under the Plan
as an unrelated unmarried equivalent of a husband or wife of an employee”).
106. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(a), (k) (West 2007).
107. See Infanti, Deconstructing the Duty to the Tax System, supra note 97, at 430-32 (describing the
request for guidance).
108. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Advice 2006-08-038 (Feb. 24, 2006).
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however, came a change in position. In 2010, the IRS’s Office of Chief Counsel
issued a new memorandum in which it reversed course and concluded that the
application of California’s community property laws to same-sex couples would
be respected for federal tax purposes.109 At the same time, the IRS issued a
private letter ruling to an individual taxpayer generally explaining the application
of this new position for income and gift tax purposes.110 The next day, the IRS’s
Office of Chief Counsel issued another memorandum explaining the application
of this new position to a taxpayer’s offer in compromise of a tax liability under
§ 7122.111
Interestingly, the IRS issued none of this guidance in a form that taxpayers are
permitted to rely upon—by statute, none of this guidance is permitted to be “used
or cited as precedent.”112 In her 2010 Annual Report to Congress, the National
Taxpayer Advocate sharply criticized the IRS for failing to provide generally
applicable, precedential guidance to same-sex couples concerning the application
of the federal tax laws to them:
DOMA and various state laws regarding domestic partnerships and
same-gender marriages give rise to a large number of unintended or
unforeseen federal tax law ambiguities, making it possible for hun-
dreds of thousands of taxpayers to take inconsistent positions in good
faith. The National Taxpayer Advocate believes that it is a basic
responsibility of government to provide taxpayers with sufficient
guidance to enable them to comply with the law.
In conclusion, our preliminary recommendation is the IRS Office of
Chief Counsel should publish a revenue ruling, establish adequate safe
harbors, or issue other precedential guidance of general applicabil-
ity.113
The IRS responded to the National Taxpayer Advocate’s recommendation by
rejecting the notion that it can provide useful, generally applicable guidance to
same-sex couples.114 The IRS did, however, leave the door open to providing
advice to taxpayers “tailored to their particular state’s law.”115 But, as the
National Taxpayer Advocate noted in her report, it will likely be prohibitively
expensive for same-sex couples to submit private letter ruling requests to obtain
109. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Advice 2010-21-050 (May 5, 2010).
110. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2010-21-048 (May 5, 2010).
111. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Advice 2010-21-049 (May 6, 2010).
112. I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-90).
113. 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, at 218 (2010), available at
http://www.irs.gov/advocate/article/0,,id233846,00.html.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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confirmation regarding the application of the tax laws to their individual
situations.116
From a moral perspective, President Obama’s decision to cease defending the
indefensible Defense of Marriage Act117 in court is clearly a giant step in the right
direction.118 It is far from clear, however, what the practical, legal effect of this
order will be, especially given that the executive branch is nonetheless continuing
to enforce the federal prohibition against recognizing same-sex marriages.119 If
anything, this move has only further muddied the waters surrounding the
application of the federal tax laws to same-sex couples.120
III. EXAMINING A WOUND
With the carving out of the intersection of tax with sexual and gender identity
now under way, wounds are being inflicted on both the taxpayer and the tax
system alike.121 In this section, I turn to examining one of the handful of judicial
decisions regarding the application of the tax laws to LGBT individuals. A close
reading of this case will provide us the opportunity to debride some of the
wounds being inflicted by this ongoing intersectional violence while, at the same
time, revealing the depth and extent of the damage inflicted on both the taxpayer
and the tax system.
The case that I have chosen to focus on is O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner.122
In that case, the Tax Court considered the propriety of a transgender individual’s
deduction of the costs of hormone therapy, sex reassignment surgery (SRS), and
breast augmentation as medical expenses under § 213 of the Internal Revenue
Code.123 The issue before the Tax Court was whether these expenses were for
116. Id. at 214. The National Taxpayer Advocate’s focus in her report on the user fee that a taxpayer
must pay in order to get the IRS to consider a private letter ruling request completely misses what, in my
experience, is usually the most significant expense associated with such a request, namely the attorney’s
fees incurred to prepare and submit the request. See id. & n.35 (stating that a private letter ruling request
can cost “hundreds or thousands of dollars” and speaking only of a taxpayer’s inability to pay the user
fee).
117. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-90).
118. See Charlie Savage & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, In Turnabout, U.S. Says Marriage Act Blocks Gay
Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2011, at A1.
119. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker of the U.S.
House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/49404879/Attorney-
General-Holder-s-Letter-to-John-Boehner-on-DOMA-Appeal.
120. Anthony C. Infanti, Questions Raised by Obama Shift on DOMA, FEMINIST LAW PROFESSORS
(Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2011/02/follow-obama-shift-doma/.
121. See generally Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Protest, “A Homosexual,” and Frivolity: A Deconstruction-
ist Meditation, 24 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 21 (2005) (describing Robert Mueller’s tax cases and
asserting that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s labeling of Mueller’s tax arguments as
“frivolous” was itself frivolous, silly, and groundless).
122. 134 T.C. 34 (2010).
123. Id. at 35; see I.R.C. § 213 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-90).
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(deductible) “medical care”124 or instead for (nondeductible) “cosmetic sur-
gery.”125 In a reviewed decision,126 a sharply fractured Tax Court held that the
taxpayer was entitled to deduct her expenses for hormone therapy and sex
reassignment surgery, but not the expenses for breast augmentation.127
We will begin with a description of the factual background of this case. Next,
even though it may be difficult and disturbing at times, we will turn to
scrutinizing the opinions in the case. We will first bear witness as O’Donnabhain
is marked with a subordinating otherness—implicitly by the Tax Court majority
and then quite explicitly by the dissenting Tax Court judges. In contrast, we will
witness one of the concurring Tax Court judges marking the tax laws with an
exalted form of otherness in his opinion. Finally, we will reflect on all that we
have witnessed in the Tax Court opinions and take stock of the damage wrought
by the violent carving out of the intersection of tax with sexual and gender
identity.
A. BACKGROUND
Rhiannon O’Donnabhain, the taxpayer in this case, was born male, but since
childhood “had experienced extreme discomfort with her anatomical sex and felt
a deep sense of inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex.”128 Over time,
these feelings only grew stronger. To combat them, O’Donnabhain entered the
military, then worked in the male-dominated field of engineering, and finally
married and had three children.129 Yet, “the[] feelings of conflict with her body
intensified, resulting in regular, severe emotional pain. . . . The emotional turmoil
increased to such an extent that by 1996, Ms. O’Donnabhain felt like her life was
unraveling.”130
124. For this purpose, “medical care” is defined as “amounts paid . . . for the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of
the body.” I.R.C. § 213(d)(1)(A).
125. For this purpose, “cosmetic surgery” is defined as “any procedure which is directed at improving
the patient’s appearance and does not meaningfully promote the proper function of the body or prevent or
treat illness or disease.” Id. § 213(d)(9)(B). Nonetheless, “cosmetic surgery” does not include any
“surgery or procedure [that] is necessary to ameliorate a deformity arising from, or directly related to, a
congenital abnormality, a personal injury resulting from an accident or trauma, or disfiguring disease.” Id.
§ 213(d)(9)(A).
126. “A ‘reviewed’ opinion is a published Tax Court opinion that was reviewed by the entire Tax Court
and has precedential effect. It differs from a ‘regular’ opinion in that the court determined that the issue
was of such significance that it required full review by all members of the court.” Mark F. Sommer &
Anne D. Waters, Tax Court Memorandum Decisions—What Are They Worth?, 80 TAX NOTES 384, 385 n.9
(1998).
127. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 73, 76-77.
128. Petition to Tax Court, O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, No. 6402-06, at 3 (T.C. Apr. 3, 2006), available
at http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/in-re-rhiannon-odonnabhain/odonnabhain-tax-court-petition.
pdf.
129. Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, In re Rhiannon O’Donnabhain, http://www.glad.org/
work/cases/in-re-rhiannon-odonnabhain/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2011) [hereinafter GLAD].
130. Petition, supra note 128, at 4.
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After her marriage ended, O’Donnabhain’s therapist diagnosed her with
gender identity disorder (GID), “finding that [she] met the criteria set forth in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-
IV), and as a transsexual, in accordance with the criteria for transsexualism in the
International Classification of Diseases–10.”131 In both cases, the standard for
treatment required individualized assessment, and the treatment could range from
hormone therapy, to living in the new gender role, to surgery.132 As part of her
treatment, O’Donnabhain began to take feminizing hormones in 1997.133 In
2000, she “underwent surgery to feminize her facial features,” legally changed
her name, and began to present as female in her daily life.134 Then, in 2001,
O’Donnabhain underwent sex reassignment surgery.135 Following the surgery,
“O’Donnabhain finally ha[d] a sense of comfort with her body. Feelings of
conflict and pain . . . disappeared as she . . . succeeded in integrating her physi-
cal, mental, and emotional selves.”136
The costs for the surgeries and other care relating to O’Donnabhain’s transition
totaled approximately $25,000.137 Given that her sex reassignment surgery was
part of the medically indicated treatment for a diagnosed illness, O’Donnabhain
deducted the costs of that and all related treatment on her federal income tax
return as an expense for medical care.138 O’Donnabhain was then audited. The
local IRS office seemed willing to allow the deduction; however, after seeking
advice from the IRS Office of Chief Counsel, the local IRS office disallowed the
deduction on the ground that O’Donnabhain’s sex reassignment surgery and
related treatment was “cosmetic surgery or other similar procedure[].”139
As mentioned above, the question before the Tax Court was whether
O’Donnabhain’s position that these expenses were for medical care or the IRS’s
contrary assertion that they were for cosmetic surgery was correct. Ultimately,
the Tax Court concluded that O’Donnabhain’s expenses for hormone therapy and
sex reassignment surgery were deductible because she had incurred those
expenses to treat a disease (i.e., gender identity disorder).140 The Tax Court did,
however, disallow the deduction for the breast augmentation surgery. Because the
surgeon had not made a documented finding that O’Donnabhain’s breast growth
as a result of hormone therapy was insufficient to provide her with comfort in a
131. Id. at 3.
132. Id. at 4.
133. O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 39 (2010).
134. Id. at 39-40.
135. Id. at 41.
136. Petition, supra note 128, at 7.
137. GLAD, supra note 129.
138. Petition, supra note 128, at 7.
139. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Advice 2006-03-025 (Jan. 20, 2006). Transgender individuals also face the
same battle over whether their gender-confirmation-related care is medically necessary or merely
cosmetic when attempting to seek reimbursement under state Medicaid programs. Dean Spade,
Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731, 783-88 (2008).
140. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 70.
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female gender role, the court found that the surgery had not been performed in
strict adherence with the accepted treatment guidelines.141 As a result, the court
concluded that the breast augmentation surgery was not performed to treat gender
identity disorder, but was, instead, nondeductible cosmetic surgery.142
B. A SUBORDINATING “OTHERNESS”
With this factual background, we can now turn to a close reading of the
opinions in O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner. We will begin with Judge Gale’s
lengthy opinion for the Tax Court majority. Following that, we will turn to the
dissenting opinions of Judges Foley and Gustafson. As we will see, all three of
these opinions mark O’Donnabhain with a distinctly subordinating form of
“otherness.”
1. The Majority
a. Losing One’s Humanity. Naturally, Judge Gale began his majority opinion,
which was joined by seven other Tax Court judges,143 with a recitation of the
facts of O’Donnabhain’s case.144 You may have already noticed that my
recitation of the facts above relies, for the most part, not upon Judge Gale’s
opinion but on the pleadings that O’Donnabhain filed with the Tax Court and
material published on her lawyers’ web site. I do this not because the stories that
they tell are fundamentally different, but because, in Judge Gale’s opinion, we
glimpse very little of O’Donnabhain’s own experience of gender identity
disorder, despite its being at the heart of this case. In the majority opinion, we see
O’Donnabhain only from a distance, her experience—and her humanity—
diminished by a court holding for her but at the same time holding her away.
Descriptions of O’Donnabhain’s feelings from her own perspective are peppered
with phrases like “internal conflict”;145 “dissonance”;146 “acute distress”;147
141. Id. at 72-73.
142. Id. at 73.
143. Id. at 77.
144. Id. at 35-42.
145. GLAD, supra note 129.
146. Id.
147. Id.; see also Pretrial Memorandum for Petitioner at 2, O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34
(2010) (No. 6402-06) (“Ms. O’Donnabhain will testify about the emotional distress and suffering she
experienced because of the discordance between her anatomical birth sex and her gender identity.”); id.
(“significant distress”); id. at 3 (“profound distress”); id. at 5 (“serious emotional pain and distress”); id.
at 16 (“severe, clinically significant distress”); id. at 23 (“clinically significant distress”); Post-Trial Brief
of Petitioner at 24, O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. 34 (No. 6402-06) (“O’Donnabhain experienced significant
psychological symptoms, distress and impairment as a result of her gender conflict.”); id. at 25 (“Ms.
O’Donnabhain’s distress at having male genitals became so great that at one point she took a carving
knife and contemplated removing her genitals.”); id. at 32 (“the facial feminizing surgery performed by
Reardon helped to reduce her psychological distress”); id. at 49-50 (“All of the evidence . . . demon-
strated the critically high levels of distress that Ms. O’Donnabhain experienced as a result of the
discordance between her anatomy and her gender identity.”); id. at 60 (“clinically significant distress”);
2012] 23A COLLISION OF “OTHERS”
“intense shame”;148 “inner discord”;149 “suffering”;150 “‘feels broken’ and
‘unwired’”;151 “a lifetime of feeling utterly alone and misunderstood”;152
“extreme discomfort . . . and a deep sense of inappropriateness”;153 “regular,
severe emotional pain”;154 “emotional turmoil”;155 and “her life was unravel-
ing.”156 O’Donnabhain even testified that she “had thoughts of suicide. She never
had a plan or intent, but had feelings that she would be better off dead because she
could not find a way ‘to make the pain go away.’”157 Following her sex
reassignment surgery, O’Donnabhain expressed “a sense of comfort with her
body. Feelings of conflict and pain . . . disappeared as she has succeeded in
integrating her physical, mental, and emotional selves.”158 O’Donnabhain even
went so far as to say that she was “not sure that she could have continued living
without the relief she finally attained through sex reassignment surgery.”159 Even
the IRS noted in its brief that O’Donnabhain had testified at trial “that she would
have been on drugs, been an alcoholic, or killed herself if she did not have [sex
reassignment surgery].”160 The IRS further noted that the psychologist who
provided the confirming opinion in advance of O’Donnabhain’s sex reassignment
surgery testified that “if petitioner had not had profound distress, she would not
have been an appropriate candidate for gender reassignment surgery.”161 Press
reports of the testimony at trial echo these same themes and describe how
O’Donnabhain at times burst into tears while testifying.162
id. at 61 (same); Post-Trial Reply Brief of Petitioner at 5, O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. 34 (No. 6402-06)
(same); id. at 27 (same); id. at 47 (“debilitating distress”); id. at 48 (“overwhelming pain and distress”).
148. Post-Trial Brief of Petitioner, supra note 147, at 23.
149. GLAD, supra note 129; see also Pretrial Memorandum for Petitioner, supra note 147, at 5
(“profound conflict”).
150. GLAD, supra note 129.
151. Post-Trial Brief of Petitioner, supra note 147, at 24.
152. GLAD, supra note 129.
153. Petition, supra note 128, at 3.
154. Id. at 4; see also Pretrial Memorandum for Petitioner, supra note 147, at 4 (“severe emotional
pain”); Post-Trial Brief of Petitioner, supra note 147, at 26 (“she needed the hormone therapy and sex
reassignment surgery ‘to help me end this pain that I was in’”); id. at 44-45 (“[T]he expenses at issue were
to treat the pain, debilitation and symptomology that she was experiencing as a result of her GID.”).
155. Petition, supra note 128, at 4; see also Pretrial Memorandum for Petitioner, supra note 147, at 5
(same).
156. Petition, supra note 8, at 4; see also Pretrial Memorandum for Petitioner, supra note 147, at 5.
157. Post-Trial Brief of Petitioner, supra note 147, at 25.
158. Petition, supra note 128, at 7.
159. Id.
160. Opening Brief for Respondent at 16, O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34 (2010) (No.
6402-06).
161. Id. at 64. Of course, the IRS then went on to try to cast doubt on both the psychologist’s
conclusion that O’Donnabhain had suffered from profound distress and O’Donnabhain’s statements and
testimony that underpinned that conclusion. Id. at 64-66, 206-08.
162. Jeremiah Coder, Sex Change Operation Case Dwells on Medical Testimony and Emotion, 116
TAX NOTES 348 (2007); Ethan Jacobs, Experts at Tax Trial Explain Gender Identity Disorder, EDGE
(Boston, Mass.), July 26, 2007, http://www.edgeboston.com/index.php?chnews&scglbt&
sc2news&sc3&id22005.
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In contrast, Judge Gale’s opinion is nearly devoid of empathy for the pain and
distress that O’Donnabhain felt prior to her surgery and the relief that she
experienced following surgery. Mentions of O’Donnabhain’s mental state in the
recitation of the facts are few and far between. The few that are included employ
far less powerful or emotive language than is used to convey O’Donnabhain’s
own perspective. For instance, Judge Gale speaks of O’Donnabhain’s “discom-
fort” (or, alternatively, being “uncomfortable”) with a male gender role.163
Notably, when O’Donnabhain’s therapist “explained that Ms. O’Donnabhain felt
‘extremely uncomfortable in the male role,’” she proceeded to correct herself and
say that “‘uncomfortable is not a strong enough word.’”164 Even Judge Holmes,
who wrote a separate concurring opinion that will be more fully addressed below,
eschewed speaking in terms of O’Donnabhain’s “discomfort” with a male gender
role.165 Instead, Judge Holmes used the stronger language employed in convey-
ing O’Donnabhain’s own perspective, speaking of her “psychological dis-
tress”166 and “pathological anxiety or distress.”167
Judge Gale also refers to O’Donnabhain’s “anxiety” about having male
genitalia.168 At one point, Judge Gale repeats the observations of O’Donnabhain’s
psychotherapist, who “observed that [O’Donnabhain] was sad and anxious, had
very low self-esteem, had limited social interactions, and was obsessed with
issues concerning the incongruence between her perceived gender and anatomi-
cal sex.”169 Judge Gale does note that “[a]fter beginning hormone therapy
[O’Donnabhain] told [her psychotherapist] that she felt calmer and better
emotionally and that she felt positive about her physical changes.”170 And, in a
footnote, Judge Gale notes that, “[i]n one instance, [O’Donnabhain] held a knife
and had an urge to cut off her penis.”171 Even though “clinically significant
distress or impairment” has been a prerequisite for a diagnosis of gender identity
disorder since 1994,172 it is not until the very end of the opinion, in the
two-paragraph conclusion, that Judge Gale acknowledges that “petitioner would
163. O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 35, 36 (2010).
164. Post-Trial Brief of Petitioner, supra note 147, at 24; see also Post-Trial Reply Brief of Petitioner,
supra note 147, at 15 (repeating the same quotations from the psychotherapist).
165. In fact, a “focus” search of the opinion on LEXIS to find instances of variations on the word
“comfort” (the exact search terms were “discomfort!,” “uncomfort!,” and “comfort!”) revealed that only
Judge Gale used these terms to refer to O’Donnabhain’s condition. The only other instance was in Judge
Foley’s separate opinion, and it did not refer to O’Donnabhain’s mental state but to the IRS’s level of
comfort with its own interpretation of § 213. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 109 (Foley, J., concurring and
dissenting).
166. Id. at 98 (Holmes, J., concurring).
167. Id. at 99-100.
168. Id. at 40 (majority opinion).
169. Id. at 36.
170. Id. at 39.
171. Id. at 40 n.17.
172. See Opening Brief for Respondent, supra note 160, at 20-22 (describing the evolution of, and
current criteria for, the gender identity disorder diagnosis in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders).
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not have undergone hormone therapy and sex reassignment surgery except in an
effort to alleviate the distress and suffering attendant to GID.”173
By limiting mention of O’Donnabhain’s mental state—a crucial part of any
diagnosis of gender identity disorder174—and downplaying that mental state
when it is mentioned, Judge Gale, consciously or unconsciously, distances
himself from O’Donnabhain. Judge Gale, in effect, preempts O’Donnabhain’s
repeated accounts of her suffering and replaces them with a more benign account
of his own. Moreover, once Judge Gale turns to interpreting the law and assessing
whether GID constitutes a “disease” within the meaning of § 213, he pushes
O’Donnabhain even further into the background. One of the factors that Judge
Gale took into account in making this determination was whether there was “[a]
determination by a mental health professional that the condition created a
significant impairment to normal functioning, warranting treatment.”175 In
considering this factor, Judge Gale spoke in the most general of terms:
GID is a serious, psychologically debilitating condition. Respondent’s
characterization of the condition on brief as a “social construction” and
“not a significant psychiatric disorder” is undermined by both of his
own expert witnesses and the medical literature in evidence. All three
expert witnesses agreed that, absent treatment, GID in genetic males is
sometimes associated with autocastration, autopenectomy, and suicide.
Respondent’s expert Dr. Schmidt asserts that remaining ambiguous
about gender identity “will tear you apart psychologically”. Petition-
er’s expert Dr. Brown likewise testified that GID produces significant
distress and maladaption. Psychiatric reference texts, established as
reliable authority by Dr. Brown’s testimony, confirm the foregoing.176
Noticeably lacking here is any reference to O’Donnabhain’s own experience of
gender identity disorder. This entire description relates to the generic experience
of those with GID. When Judge Gale does turn to GID’s effects on O’Donnabhain,
which is ostensibly the point of the inquiry, he merely states, “Ms. Ellaborn
[O’Donnabhain’s psychotherapist] concluded that petitioner exhibited clinically
significant impairment from GID, to the extent that she designated petitioner’s
condition as ‘severe’ under the DSM-IV-TR standards.”177
173. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 77. Judge Gale does use the word “distress” earlier in his opinion;
however, in each instance, the word is used to describe the effects of gender identity disorder generally
and not to refer to O’Donnabhain in particular. Id. at 36, 37 n.7, 43, 53, 59, 61, 70, 75 n.55.
174. See id. at 36 (listing the criteria for diagnosing gender identity disorder).
175. Id. at 59.
176. Id. at 61.
177. Id.
26 [Vol. XIII:1THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF GENDER AND THE LAW
In all of these ways, Judge Gale marks O’Donnabhain as “other”—an
otherness that has a strong flavor of subordination to it. O’Donnabhain is
relegated to the background in her own case and, even when her experience is
brought to the fore, it is distorted in such a way as to minimize the impact of her
suffering. Litigation often requires us “to tell a partial, stylized version of [our]
stories that fits what the legal system wants to hear.”178 But even conformed to
legal expectations, O’Donnabhain’s story, as told through her pleadings and
briefs, retains great emotional impact. Yet, in his majority opinion, Judge Gale
manages to wring nearly all of that emotional impact from O’Donnabhain’s story
by displacing her own subjectivity with his own. Thus, Judge Gale’s marking of
O’Donnabhain as “other” not only diminishes the consequentiality of her
suffering, but also implicitly diminishes her humanity—and, concomitantly,
perhaps even Judge Gale’s own.179
178. INFANTI, supra note 13, at 14.
179. Emmanuel Levinas has powerfully expressed the relationship between self and other in terms of
responsibility and obligation, not diminution and distancing:
No one can stay in himself; the humanity of man, subjectivity, is a responsibility for others, an
extreme vulnerability. The return to self becomes interminable detour. Prior to consciousness
and choice, before the creature collects himself in present and representation to make himself
essence, man approaches man . . . .
. . . .
. . . . But man must also be thought from the responsibility more ancient than the conatus of
substance or interior identification, thought from the responsibility that, always calling on the
outside, precisely disturbs that interiority; man must be thought from self putting himself
despite himself in the place of everyone, substituted for everyone because of his very
non-interchangeability; man must be thought from the condition or incondition of hostage,
hostage of all the others who, precisely others, do not belong to the same genre as me, because I
am responsible for them without reposing in their responsibility to me which would allow them
to substitute themselves for me, because even for their responsibility I am, in the last analysis
and from the beginning, responsible. It is by this supplementary responsibility that subjectivity
is not the Ego [le Moi], but me [moi].
EMMANUEL LEVINAS, HUMANISM OF THE OTHER 67-68 (Nidra Poller trans., 2006). These are but a few
quotations culled from the text; for a fuller sense of Levinas’s thoughts, please read the entire essay,
Without Identity, id. at 58-69. As Richard Cohen notes in his introduction to this book:
The “otherness” of the other person arises precisely as the moral imperative that pierces the self
with moral obligation, with service to the other. Indeed, the true self-hood of the self occurs
precisely in and as this service. One is not called on to “love thy neighbor as oneself,”
according to the biblical precept, as if self-love preceded other-love and were the measure of
other-love. Rather, the proper formulation of Levinas’s thought is more extreme, an infinite
demand never satisfied even in its fulfillment: to “love thy neighbor is oneself.”
Richard A. Cohen, Humanism and Anti-humanism—Levinas, Cassirer, and Heidegger, Introduction to
EMMANUEL LEVINAS, HUMANISM OF THE OTHER vii, xxvii (Nidra Poller trans., 2006).
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b. A Study in Contrast. Judge Gale’s treatment of O’Donnabhain stands in stark
contrast to the treatment of other taxpayers claiming medical expense deductions
in novel situations. Take for instance the case of Grunwald v. Commissioner.180
In Grunwald, the taxpayers claimed a deduction for the cost of private school
tuition as a medical expense. The taxpayers claimed that the private school
education was therapeutic because it minimized the effects of their son Peter’s
handicap.181 Peter, who was blind, had been attending public school, but was
placed in a classroom for handicapped children. Because the local Chicago public
school system had refused to integrate blind students into classrooms with
children who could see, the taxpayers were advised by a number of people to
move their son to a private school so that he could be placed in a “regular school
program with children who could see.”182 Only one of the several private schools
that the taxpayers contacted—Morgan Park Academy—was both willing and
equipped to try this “experiment.”183 Peter enrolled at Morgan Park and thrived
there academically.184
In Grunwald, the Tax Court showed far more empathy to the taxpayers and
their son than Judge Gale shows to O’Donnabhain. The Tax Court described
Peter’s experience at Morgan Park as follows:
The experience of participating in Morgan Park’s regular academic
program with normal seeing students of above average to superior
intellectual abilities has resulted in Peter’s having grown in confidence
in his own intellectual capacities and ability to learn. Peter has acquired
a capacity to function socially as well as academically, as evidenced by
his conversational abilities and interest in other students. All of this has
contributed to his having achieved an emotional sturdiness, a degree of
social maturity and confidence to function in a sighted world which he
might not have otherwise achieved.185
Though clearly sympathetic, the Tax Court ultimately denied the deduction:
Tuition and associated expenses . . . were incurred for primary reasons
including alleviation of the handicap of blindness, with the specific aim
to minimize limitations and deprivations directly associated with the
inability to see and to establish and develop specific functions of body
and mind not required by those who do see—and thus to restore to the
largest extent possible the ability to live a normal, useful and
satisfactory life.
180. Grunwald v. Comm’r, 51 T.C. 108, 108 (1968).
181. Id. at 108, 113.
182. Id. at 109.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 109-10.
185. Id. at 111.
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While the petitioners’ argument is novel, and indeed appealing from
an equitable standpoint, we do not find it legally sound or convincing in
these circumstances.186
Feeling “constrained” by the Internal Revenue Code and associated regulations,
the Tax Court declined “to rewrite the statute in a new image by judicial edict,”
leaving that task to Congress.187 The court then went out of its way to mix
statements lauding Peter and his parents in with its conclusion:
No doubt the Morgan Park educational services paid by the petitioners
were beneficial to Peter’s general health and well-being and prepared
him to live better in a seeing world. And no doubt the achievements
accomplished are attributable in some degree to the educational
atmosphere at Morgan Park, to the perseverance and ability of Peter,
and to the assistance, encouragement, and selfless dedication of his
parents. However, it is settled law that expenses beneficial to a person’s
general health and well-being, but permeated with personal consider-
ations, do not constitute “medical care” as defined in section 213(e)(1)
and the regulations promulgated thereunder.188
And this is not an isolated case. Other (non-LGBT) taxpayers have similarly
encountered empathetic Tax Court judges when bringing novel claims for
medical expense deductions.189
2. The Dissenters
The subordinating “otherness” with which O’Donnabhain is tacitly marked by
Judge Gale’s opinion for the Tax Court majority becomes more explicit, more
concrete when we move on to consider the opinions of the judges who dissented
from that decision. These judges reify O’Donnabhain’s subordinating otherness
in both similar and different ways.
As Judge Halpern notes in his concurring opinion, dissenting Judges Foley and
Gustafson (and those who joined their opinions) go out of their way to decide
against allowing O’Donnabhain to deduct expenses relating to her hormone
therapy, sex reassignment surgery, and breast augmentation.190 Judge Halpern
wryly observes in a footnote that:
186. Id. at 113.
187. Id. at 115-16.
188. Id. at 115.
189. See Sims v. Comm’r, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 700, 706 (1979) (“Although we are keenly and
sympathetically aware of the anguish suffered by petitioners in respect of David’s problems, we are
compelled to find that neither Fessenden nor Chapel Hill-Chauncy Hall qualified as a ‘special school’.”);
Randolph v. Comm’r, 67 T.C. 481 passim (1976) (describing at length the plight of a couple with severe
chemical allergies and allowing a deduction for the increased costs incurred by them to purchase only
organic foods).
190. O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 78 (2010) (Halpern, J., concurring).
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Clearly the issues before us are important to respondent [Commis-
sioner of the IRS]. His opening brief is 209 pages long, and his
answering brief is 72 pages long. Between them, the two briefs show a
total of eight attorneys assisting the Chief Counsel, in whose name the
briefs are filed. I assume that respondent made all the arguments that he
thought persuasive.191
And this in a case where the asserted tax deficiency was a paltry192 $5,679 and the
issue was straightforward.193 Yet, notwithstanding an expenditure of government
time and effort in briefing this case that seems out of all proportion to the revenue
at stake, both Judge Foley and Judge Gustafson take the time to develop
additional arguments against O’Donnabhain’s position.
There is some debate about whether it is appropriate for judges to raise and
consider arguments that the parties to the lawsuit did not raise themselves.194
Even were we to accept that it is appropriate for judges “to reach the best
conclusion (to ‘get it right’) in each case” because judges determine the law not
only for the parties before them but also for the public,195 the additional
arguments raised and considered by the dissenters in this case seem superfluous.
Given the exhaustive (and exhausting) briefing of this case as well as the number
of attorneys and expert witnesses involved, it seems highly unlikely that the
parties missed the best or most valid arguments for resolving the issue presented
to the court. Moreover, the dissenters raise arguments that are spurious and, in the
case of Judge Gustafson’s dissent, motivated by obvious animus toward
O’Donnabhain.
191. Id. at 78 n.1.
192. At least from the government’s perspective.
193. Opening Brief for Respondent, supra note 160, at 1, 2; Post-Trial Brief of Petitioner, supra note
147, at 1. Not only is the cost in lost revenue small in this individual case, but it is small overall. Given the
tiny fraction of individuals within the transgender community who seek sex reassignment surgery each
year, a decision in O’Donnabhain’s favor hardly results in throwing the doors to the treasury wide open:
A . . . study in the DSM IV estimates that one in 10,000 people seek sex reassignment surgery
each year in the United States. Within the transgender community, surgery is not common.
Approximately 1%–3% of all transgender individuals actually undergo genital reassignment
surgery. This figure reflects the high cost of surgery, but also the fact that many groups within
the transgender community do not desire genital reassignment surgery. For example,
expressing gender through hairstyle or clothing is sufficient for some transgender people.
Alternatively, some transgender people are ineligible for surgery because they have other
medical issues.
Travis Cox, Comment, Medically Necessary Treatments for Transgender Prisoners and the Misguided
Law in Wisconsin, 24 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 341, 360-61 (2009) (footnotes omitted); see also Helen
G. Berrigan, Transsexual Marriage: A Trans-Atlantic Judicial Dialogue, 12 LAW & SEXUALITY 87, 88 n.6
(2003) (“Information from some European nations indicate [sic] that roughly one out of 30,000 adult
males and one out of 100,000 adult females seek sex-reassignment surgery.”).
194. See generally Sarah M.R. Cravens, Involved Appellate Judging, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 251 (2004)
(considering the question of when, if ever, it is appropriate for appellate judges to consider arguments not
raised by the parties).
195. Id. at 294-95.
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a. Judge Foley’s Opinion. When addressing these additional arguments,
which Judge Gale flatly ignores in his opinion for the majority,196 Judge Halpern
reserves his harshest words for Judge Foley’s opinion. In that opinion, which was
joined by four other judges (including Judge Gustafson), Judge Foley openly
accuses Judge Gale and the majority of judicial activism when they interpret
§ 213 in O’Donnabhain’s favor: “In allowing deductions relating to petitioner’s
expenses, the majority has performed, on congressional intent, interpretive
surgery even more extensive than the surgical procedures at issue—and
respondent has dutifully assisted. This judicial transformation of section 213(d)(9)
is more than cosmetic.”197 Circumventing the entire debate about judicial
deference to agency interpretation of statutes, Judge Foley concluded his opinion
by chastising the IRS for not adopting his preferred, ostensibly plain language
interpretation of § 213 in a section titled “Congressional Activity, Rather than
Respondent’s Litigation Laxity, Should Determine Deductibility.”198 But Judge
Halpern turns Judge Foley’s own accusations against him when he observes that
Judge Foley’s arguments “simply disregard[] the rules of grammar and logic in
favor of a part of the legislative history that is silent as to the interpretative
question he fashions.”199 A clearer indictment of Judge Foley’s opinion as the
work of an activist judge—one who has contorted both law and language to rule
against O’Donnabhain—could hardly be penned.
b. Judge Gustafson’s Opinion. Yet, Judge Gustafson’s opinion, which is
joined by four other judges (including Judge Foley), is even more troubling
because it demonstrates a thinly veiled animus toward O’Donnabhain and an
inability to leave personal prejudice behind in deciding the case presented to the
court. Judge Gustafson begins his opinion by making it clear that he has only
grudgingly acquiesced in using feminine personal and possessive pronouns to
refer to O’Donnabhain: “Consistent with petitioner’s preference, I use feminine
pronouns to refer to petitioner in her post-SRS state. However, this convention
does not reflect a conclusion that petitioner’s sex has changed from male to
female.”200 As I have observed elsewhere, “[t]his latter sentence is little more
than an unseemly, gratuitous jibe,”201 especially when it is read together with the
immediately preceding sentence in the text of the opinion. In that sentence, Judge
Gustafson states, “After these procedures, petitioner ‘passed’ as female and
became happier.”202 It is also worth underscoring that Judge Gustafson refers to
196. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 78 (Halpern, J., concurring) (“My colleagues raise arguments in
support of respondent that he did not make. Because they are not addressed by the majority, I use this
opportunity to address them.” (footnote omitted)).
197. Id. at 104 (Foley, J., concurring and dissenting).
198. Id. at 108-09.
199. Id. at 85 (Halpern, J., concurring).
200. Id. at 109 n.2 (Gustafson, J., concurring and dissenting).
201. Infanti, supra note 103, at 1405.
202. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 109 (Gustafson, J., concurring and dissenting).
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O’Donnabhain in the masculine whenever the reference relates to a time before
she underwent surgery.203 Judge Gustafson therefore clearly disregards
O’Donnabhain’s self-perception regarding her gender and keys his pronouns to
her physical appearance, regardless of its dissonance with that self-perception.
Judge Gustafson also conveys a sympathy for the position that sex reassign-
ment surgery is unethical and should not be performed by doctors at all. He
begins his opinion by describing O’Donnabhain as “the father of three children
from a marriage that lasted 20 years. Although physically healthy, he was
unhappy with his male anatomy and became profoundly so, to the point of
contemplating self-mutilation.”204 After describing the medical procedures that
O’Donnabhain underwent and stating the general issue to be decided by the Tax
Court, Judge Gustafson clarifies what is not at issue in the case:
The surgical procedures involved in this case are startling, and to avoid
distraction from the actual issues, it is expedient to affirm what is not at
issue here: Neither the tax collector nor the Tax Court sits as a board of
medical review, as if it were reconsidering, validating, or overruling the
medical profession’s judgments about what medical care is appropriate
or effective for what medical conditions. Likewise, neither the tax
collector nor the Tax Court passes judgment on the ethics of legal
medical procedures, since otherwise deductible medical expenses are
not rendered non-deductible on ethical grounds. See, e.g., Rev. Rul.
73-201, 1973-1 C.B. 140 (cost of legal abortion held deductible under
section 213).205
By referring to the procedures as “startling,” essentially likening sex reassign-
ment surgery to the hot-button issue of abortion,206 and—in keeping with his
reference to the disputed ethicality of abortion—then going on to note a minority
203. E.g., id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 110.
206. Federal funding of abortion has been a source of great contention in the ongoing debate over
reforming our health care system. See, e.g., Editorial, The New Abortion Wars: A Highly Intrusive
Federal Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2011, at WK7. Indeed, a bill introduced in the U.S. House of
Representatives would disallow a deduction under I.R.C. § 213 for “amounts paid or incurred for an
abortion or for a health benefits plan that includes coverage of abortion.” No Taxpayer Funding for
Abortion Act, H.R. 3, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011). As its sponsor makes clear, this bill is high on the agenda of
the Republican House majority:
“The fact that it is designated as HR 3 speaks volumes the prioritization by Speaker (John)
Boehner and Majority Leader (Eric) Cantor,” said Rep. Chris Smith, R-N.J. Smith is the key
sponsor of the bill to write the Hyde language into permanent law. (House leaders give the first
handful of bill numbers to measures they want to highlight as legislative priorities.)
Julie Rovner, GOP Takes Latest Abortion Fight to the Tax Code, SHOTS: NPR’S HEALTH BLOG (Feb. 9,
2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2011/02/09/133596340/gop-takes-latest-abortion-fight-
to-the-tax-code?pssh_sthdl.
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view in the psychiatric community that sex reassignment surgery is unethical,207
Judge Gustafson squarely places a frame of moral revulsion around his opinion.
Judge Gustafson then spends the remainder of his opinion painting a rather
repulsive picture to fill this frame. He begins by turning to the language of § 213,
which defines nondeductible “cosmetic surgery” to include “any procedure
which is directed at improving the patient’s appearance and does not meaning-
fully promote the proper function of the body or prevent or treat illness or
disease.”208 In refuting Judge Goeke’s assertion in his concurring opinion that
O’Donnabhain’s sex reassignment surgery was not cosmetic surgery because it
did not improve her appearance but was instead functional, Judge Gustafson
managed not only to reaffirm his revulsion toward O’Donnabhain but also to
essentialize women as little more than reproductive vessels:
[T]here is no basis for the conclusion that SRS [sex reassignment
surgery] is “functional”. Petitioner’s SRS did not involve any attempt
to confer female reproductive function. No one undertaking to
“promote” sexual “function” would perform a penectomy and a
castration on a healthy male body. On the contrary, SRS drastically
terminates a male patient’s functioning sexuality. SRS did not change
petitioner into a “function[ing]” female, but removed his salient male
characteristics and attempted to make him resemble a woman—i.e., by
petitioner’s lights, to “improve[ ] the patient’s appearance”. The
majority shows that the SRS surgeon does try to salvage, as much as
possible, some possibility for subsequent sexual response, and ob-
serves that SRS “alter[s] appearance (and, to some degree, function)”;
but the majority makes no finding that petitioner proved that any
identifiable portion of the SRS expense can be allocated to restoration
of “function”. On our record, petitioner’s SRS must be said to have
been directed at improving appearance rather than promoting function,
and it is therefore within the definition of “cosmetic surgery”.209
Things grow even uglier when Judge Gustafson begins to discuss whether
O’Donnabhain’s sex reassignment surgery constitutes “treatment” for gender
identity disorder. Judge Gustafson first partakes of Judge Foley’s contortion of
language when he blithely draws a distinction between the words “treat” and
“mitigate” that is directly contrary to the definitions that he chooses to employ.210
207. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 110 n.3 (Gustafson, J., concurring and dissenting).
208. I.R.C. § 213(d)(9)(B) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-90).
209. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 112 n.4 (Gustafson, J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasis and
citations omitted).
210. Id. at 116-17. Judge Gustafson accepted the definition of “treat” as “‘to deal with (a disease,
patient, etc.) in order to relieve or cure.’” Id. at 116 (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED
DICTIONARY 2015 (2003)). He then indicated that the same dictionary “observes that the ‘central meaning
[of ‘mitigate’] is ‘to lessen’ or ‘make less severe.’” Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED
DICTIONARY 1233 (2003)). Ignoring the plain language of these definitions, Judge Gustafson concludes
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He then displaces O’Donnabhain’s own sense of self—as well as the considered
judgment of her doctors—and substitutes it with his own preconceived notion211
that O’Donnabhain is suffering from a “delusion”212 and that sex reassignment
surgery is, in no sense, a treatment for her mental disorder.
Because the force of Judge Gustafson’s disdain for O’Donnabhain (and the
transgender community more broadly) would be diminished in any attempt to
recapitulate his polemic, I will now quote from Judge Gustafson’s opinion at
length to give you a sense of its true flavor:
For the GID patient there is a dissonance between, on the one hand, his
male body (i.e., his male facial appearance, his male body hair, his
male body shape, his male genitalia, his male endocrinology, and the Y
chromosomes in the cells of his body) and, on the other hand, his
perception of himself as female. The male body conflicts with the
female self-perception and produces extreme stress, anxiety, and
unhappiness.
One could analyze the GID patient’s problem in one of two ways: (1)
His anatomical maleness is normative, and his perceived femaleness is
the problem. Or (2) his perceived femaleness is normative, and his
anatomical maleness is the problem. If one assumes option 2, then one
could say that SRS does “treat” his GID by bringing his problematic
male body into simulated conformity (as much as is possible) with his
authentic female mind.
However, the medical consensus as described in the record of this
case is in stark opposition to the latter characterization and can be
reconciled only with option 1: Petitioner’s male body was healthy, and
his mind was disordered in its female self perception. GID is in the
jurisdiction of the psychiatric profession—the doctors of the mind—
and is listed in that profession’s definitive catalog of “Mental Disor-
ders”. When a patient presents with a healthy male body and a
professed subjective sense of being female, the medical profession
does not treat his body as an anomaly, as if it were infected by the
disease of an alien maleness. Rather, his male body is taken as a given,
and the patient becomes a psychiatric patient because of his disordered
that “‘treatment’ addresses underlying causes and ‘mitigation’ lessens effects.” Id. at 117. When
considering the definition of the word “treat,” Judge Gustafson focuses only on the words immediately
preceding the parenthetical—that is, “to deal with”—and wholly ignores that this “dealing with” a
disease was for the purpose of either “reliev[ing]” or “cur[ing]” the disease. When the full definition is
considered, the words “treat” and “mitigate” overlap because, in the context of a disease, they both aim,
at least in part, at relieving or lessening the effects of the disease. Judge Halpern hints at the dubiousness
of Judge Gustafsons’s distinction between the words “treat” and “mitigate,” but accepts the distinction for
the sake of argument because he believes that Judge Gustafson reached the wrong conclusion even when
misconstruing these definitions. Id. at 78 (Halpern, J., concurring).
211. As Judge Halpern keenly observes, “Judge Gustafson cannot fathom that someone with a healthy
male body who believes he is female is not sick of mind.” Id. at 78 (Halpern, J., concurring).
212. Id. at 117 n.9 (Gustafson, J., concurring and dissenting).
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feeling that he is female. The majority concludes that GID is a “serious
mental disorder”—i.e., a disease in petitioner’s mind—and I accept
that conclusion.
A procedure that changes the patient’s healthy male body (in fact,
that disables his healthy male body) and leaves his mind unchanged
(i.e., with the continuing misperception that he is female) has not
treated his mental disease. On the contrary, that procedure has given up
on the mental disease, has capitulated to the mental disease, has
arguably even changed sides and joined forces with the mental disease.
In any event, the procedure did not (in the words of Havey v.
Commissioner) “bear directly on the * * * condition in question”, did
not “deal with” the disease (per Webster’s), did not “treat” the mental
disease that the therapist diagnosed. Rather, the procedure changed
only petitioner’s healthy body and undertook to “mitigat[e]” the effects
of the mental disease.
Even if SRS is medically indicated for the GID patient—even if SRS
is the best that medicine can do for him—it is an otherwise cosmetic
procedure that does not “treat” the mental disease. Sex reassignment
surgery is therefore within “cosmetic surgery or other similar proce-
dures” under section 213(d)(9)(A), and the expense that petitioner
incurred for that surgery is not deductible under section 213(a).213
Taken together, as they must be,214 Judge Foley’s and Judge Gustafson’s
opinions reify the majority’s marking of O’Donnabhain as “other.” Although
Judge Gale’s distancing himself from O’Donnabhain and concomitant diminish-
ing of her humanity must be sussed out from a comparison of his language with
O’Donnabhain’s own, the very surface of Judge Foley’s and Judge Gustafson’s
opinions is indelibly marked with pocks of subordination. Both judges contort
law and language and advance arguments not put forward by the IRS—in a case
that appears to have been staffed and briefed out of all proportion to the revenue
at stake—all to serve their own reactionary end of denying a deduction for
expenses related to sex reassignment surgery. Judge Gustafson then crystallizes
the subordinating effects of these arguments by expressing sympathy for the
position that sex reassignment surgery is unethical, labeling O’Donnabhain
delusional, disregarding O’Donnabhain’s sense of self, and expressing his own
judgment that sex reassignment surgery in no way treats GID. Contrary to the
opinion of medical professionals, Judge Gustafson implies that the only real
treatment for O’Donnabhain was psychotherapy to address her delusion regard-
ing her gender identity. Judge Gustafson’s paternalistic tone—a tone that clearly
signals his feeling that he knows better than both O’Donnabhain and the medical
213. Id. at 121-22 (citations omitted).
214. All five dissenters signed on to, and explicitly agreed with, both of these opinions. In other
words, Judge Foley’s opinion was joined by Judges Wells, Vasquez, Kroupa, and Gustafson. Id. at 109
(Foley, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Gustafson’s opinion was joined by Judges Wells, Vasquez,
Kroupa, and Foley. Id. at 122 (Gustafson, J., concurring and dissenting).
2012] 35A COLLISION OF “OTHERS”
professionals who treated her—could not render any clearer his condescension
toward O’Donnabhain as well as, more generally, the transgender community
and the community of medical professionals who treat GID.
At one point in his concurring opinion, to which we turn in the next section,
Judge Holmes chides the IRS for making the argument that the suffering of
people with gender identity disorder is primarily inflicted by an intolerant
society.215 Of this argument, Judge Holmes says, “It is not effective advocacy to
denigrate the people whose government one is representing.”216 The same
reproof applies equally to the dissenting judges, who spill much ink denigrating a
taxpayer who has come before—and whose taxes fund the operation of—the
court on which they sit.
C. AN EXALTED “OTHERNESS”
As we should by now expect, tax is itself marked as “other” by the
O’Donnabhain court. And, as we should further expect, this is not an “otherness”
flavored with subordination, as O’Donnabhain’s is. Rather, it is an “otherness”
that presents tax as being elevated, above the fray, somehow on a higher plane.
This is most apparent in Judge Holmes’s concurring opinion. Judge Holmes
agrees with the result reached by the majority, but takes Judge Gale to task for
including a section in his opinion explaining that sex reassignment surgery “is the
proper treatment—indeed, medically necessary at least in ‘severe’ cases—for
GID.”217 Judge Holmes feels that this discussion is not only unnecessary, but also
“drafts our Court into culture wars in which tax lawyers have heretofore claimed
noncombatant status.”218 Thus, in Judge Holmes’s eyes, tax is no party to social
and cultural debates; it is somehow above this level of political discourse. In
making this statement, Judge Holmes blatantly ignores how much a part of our
culture—and of these cultural debates—tax law really is.219 The growing critical
tax literature highlights the many ways in which the tax laws are used to reinforce
215. Id. at 91 n.3 (Holmes, J., concurring).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 85.
218. Id.
219.
Some commentators have taken critical tax theorists to task for being too willing to find
discrimination in the Code. This response can only be expected from adherents of the
traditional tax narrative, because critical analysis undermines the basic tenets of their view of
the tax system. The problem, however, with such blind adherence to the traditional tax narrative
is that it runs counter to the mirror theory of the relationship between law and society, which is
well-accepted among comparative law scholars. This theory, which might be described more
accurately as a group of theories articulated with differing levels of strength, posits that law is a
reflection of the society that created it. This theory leaves me with a question for adherents of
the traditional tax narrative: If the law (including tax law) is a reflection of the society that
created it, why wouldn’t the law reflect the biases and prejudices of that society just as well as
its core values and goals?
Infanti, Sodomy Statute, supra note 97, at 779 n.29 (citations omitted).
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majoritarian norms and form an integral part of the complex web of subordina-
tion in American society along lines of race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation,
marital status, and disability (to name a few).220
Judge Holmes underscores his (and, by extension, the tax laws’) discomfort
with O’Donnabhain (and, by extension, all transgender individuals) when he then
speaks of the “crash course on transsexualism that this case has forced on us.”221
Tax lawyers are sometimes said to be the last generalists.222 As a practical matter,
this means that tax lawyers (and Tax Court judges) are routinely required to take a
“crash course” in all sorts of subjects—from financial instruments and hedging
transactions223 to the business of professional sports224 to the regulation of
gambling225 to the nature of religious beliefs and practices226—merely to be
equipped with the basic background knowledge necessary to identify and apply
the relevant tax laws to the facts presented.227 Notwithstanding the recurring
need to undergo crash courses in all sorts of nontax subjects, a search of all Tax
Court cases revealed that this is the first time that any Tax Court (or, for that
matter, Board of Tax Appeals) judge has ever used the phrase “crash course” in an
opinion.228 By lamenting the need to do something in this case that Tax Court
judges must do in so many others, Judge Holmes implies that tax law (and the Tax
Court) is happy to grapple with the intricacies of the lives of those in the
“mainstream” or “majority,” but should be above having to grapple with the
concerns of those who are subordinated, only deigning to learn about and address
their lives when absolutely forced to do so.
220. See generally CRITICAL TAX THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (Anthony C. Infanti & Bridget J.
Crawford eds., 2009) (collecting excerpts from critical tax pieces touching on all of these lines of
subordination). To Judge Holmes’s credit, after the Tax Court issued its decision in O’Donnabhain and I
penned a short piece sharply criticizing (among other things) Judge Holmes’s unfamiliarity with critical
tax theory, see Infanti, supra note 103, he wrote me to ask if I would donate a copy of Critical Tax
Theory: An Introduction to the Tax Court library. He promised to read it, if I were to donate a copy (which
I did).
221. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 86 (Holmes, J., concurring).
222. E.g., M. Bernard Aidinoff, Tax Lawyering: A Changing Profession, 46 TAX LAW. 665 passim
(1993); Victor Fleischer, “If You Can Do Tax, You Can Do Anything,” CONGLOMERATE BLOG (Nov. 19,
2006), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2006/11/if_you_can_do_t.html.
223. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Comm’r, 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
224. First Nw. Indus. of Am., Inc. v. Comm’r, 649 F.2d 707 (9th Cir. 1981).
225. Zarin v. Comm’r, 916 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1990).
226. Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); Fred W. Amend Co. v. Comm’r, 454 F.2d 399 (7th
Cir. 1971).
227. To underscore how common these crash courses are, I was able to develop this list in a few
moments simply by flipping through the textbook that I use to teach the basic federal income tax course.
JOEL S. NEWMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS 39, 47, 153, 319, 541
(4th ed. 2008). In fact, I find that one of the greatest sources of difficulty for students in studying tax is not
necessarily the tax rules being studied, but the need to understand the underlying transaction to which the
rules are being applied.
228. On January 20, 2011, I performed this search in the TCTM database on LEXIS, which covers
U.S. Tax Court cases and memorandum decisions as well as Board of Tax Appeals decisions. The query
was simply for instances of the phrase “crash course,” and it only returned one result—O’Donnabhain v.
Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34 (2010).
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Judge Holmes reasserts tax’s privileged status when he moves to the heart of
his argument that avoiding the question of medical necessity would have been the
“sounder course.”229 Judge Holmes contends that “‘medically necessary’ is a
loaded phrase,” because “[c]onstruing it puts us squarely, and unnecessarily, in
the middle of a serious fight within the relevant scientific community, and the
larger battle among those who are deeply concerned with the proper response to
transsexual persons’ desires for extensive and expensive surgeries.”230 Ostensi-
bly to give context to Judge Gale’s discussion of GID in his opinion for the
majority, Judge Holmes outlines four different possible approaches to “transsexu-
alism”: (1) treating it as a delusion, (2) focusing on the perception of the
individual that there is a mismatch between her gender and her biological sex, (3)
treating it as a form of erotic attachment, and (4) treating it as a birth defect.231
Judge Holmes acknowledges that the fourth view is the one that is “currently
predominant . . . among those professionally involved in the field.”232 Nonethe-
less, Judge Holmes criticizes the medical standards used by the professionals
who treated O’Donnabhain on the ground that they do not necessarily reflect “the
consensus of the entire medical community.”233 In providing this “context,”
Judge Holmes implicitly gives credence to the alternative approaches—including
that embraced by Judge Gustafson of treating O’Donnabhain as delusional—and
holds the medical standards applied by the professionals in this case to an
unreasonably high threshold of acceptance.234 Moreover, Judge Holmes argues
that the organization that promulgated these standards is not only a medical but
also an advocacy organization and that it has “medicaliz[ed] its advocacy.”235
Against this background, Judge Holmes views the notion that sex reassign-
ment surgery is “the best—and perhaps the only—treatment for GID” as little
more than a political campaign.236 It has been “extensively promoted”; it has
229. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 92 (Holmes, J., concurring).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 86-88.
232. Id. at 87.
233. Id. at 88.
234. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965) (in determining whether a professional has
been negligent, judging her by the level of “skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that
profession or trade in good standing in similar communities”); id. cmt. f (“Where there are different
schools of thought in a profession, or different methods are followed by different groups engaged in a
trade, the actor is to be judged by the professional standards of the group to which he belongs. The law
cannot undertake to decide technical questions of proper practice over which experts reasonably disagree,
or to declare that those who do not accept particular controversial doctrines are necessarily negligent in
failing to do so.”); id. cmt. g (“Allowance must be made also for the type of community in which the actor
carries on his practice . . . . Such allowance for the type of community is most frequently made in
professions or trades where there is a considerable degree of variation in the skill and knowledge
possessed by those practicing it in different localities. It has commonly been made in the cases of
physicians or surgeons, because of the difference in the medical skill commonly found in different parts
of the United States, or in different types of communities.”).
235. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 90 (Holmes, J., concurring).
236. Id. at 92.
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become a “cause”; its purpose is to paint those who deny insurance coverage for
sex reassignment surgery as engaging in discrimination or unjustly deferring to
stereotypes.237 Judge Holmes, in effect, accuses Judge Gale and the majority of
dragging tax from its exalted plane of existence down into the muddy trenches of
these cultural battles.238 Implicitly, Judge Holmes once again reaffirms that tax
law’s rightful place should be above the fray of the political campaigns waged as
part of the broader “culture war.”
Ironically, what lends tax law the air that it is (or, at the very least, ought to be)
above the political fray is its liaison with the field of economics and the air of
scientificity that this liaison lends to tax law.239 In Judge Holmes’s eyes, medical
science is obviously not above the political fray here, as he sees medical
organizations engaging in advocacy and medicine being used to further political
ends. But, Judge Holmes apparently sees tax law as residing on a plane above
even the science from which its exceptionalism in part stems, as he seems to feel
that tax law should not be mired in the same politicization to which science is so
obviously susceptible.
D. NO ESCAPE UNSCATHED
O’Donnabhain’s Tax Court case is thus both a microcosm of the “otherness” of
both the LGBT community and of the tax laws as well as the site of their
collision. As we will now explore, neither of these “others”—one exalted and one
subordinated—emerges from this intersectional collision unscathed. In this
sense, simultaneously despite and because of their otherness, both the LGBT
community and the tax system are one and the same.240
237. Id.
238. Of course, as the previous section makes abundantly clear, it was the dissenters, rather than the
court’s majority, who dragged tax from its place above the fray and brought it into the crossfire of the
so-called culture war.
239. See, e.g., Miranda Stewart, Global Trajectories of Tax Reform: The Discourse of Tax Reform in
Developing and Transition Countries, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 139, 172 (2003) (“Tax reform discourse is
primarily an economic discourse, and it claims to be scientific largely through its affiliation with
economics and public finance theory. The technical nature of tax reform discourse gives it added
authority through a claim to a ‘superior form’ of knowledge.”); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Tax Stories and Tax
Histories: Is There a Role for History in Shaping Tax Law?, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2227, 2234 (2003)
(reviewing TAX STORIES: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT TEN LEADING FEDERAL INCOME TAX CASES (Paul L. Caron
ed., 2003)) (“If you listen to many academic expositions of tax law, you might think that taxation is
grounded in the exact sciences (or at least in economics), and therefore that it progresses over time—as
scientific knowledge improves, tax law gets better.”); id. at 2237 (“One view of tax scholarship in the last
three decades is that it has tried mightily to distance itself from politics and present itself as a neutral
science that is based on economic or philosophical principles and hence improves over time.”).
240. DERRIDA, GIFT OF DEATH supra note 5, at 87 (“For the game between these two unique ‘every
others,’ like the same ‘every other,’ opens the space and introduces the hope of salvation, the economy of
‘saving oneself’ that we shall shortly discuss. Linking alterity to singularity or to what one could call the
universal exception or the law of the exception (tout autre est tout autre signifies that every other is
singular, that every one is singularity, which also means that every one is each one, a proposition that
seals the contract between universality and the exception of singularity), this play of words seems to
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1. Damage to O’Donnabhain
On the surface, O’Donnabhain emerges victorious, but only partially. She was
permitted to deduct the expenses related to her sex reassignment surgery and her
hormone therapy, but the deduction for her breast augmentation surgery was
denied. The denial of the latter deduction was ostensibly based on her surgeon’s
failure to document the need for the surgery in accordance with the prevailing
treatment standard. Yet, as Judge Halpern observes, Judge Gale’s majority
opinion did not treat this as a mere failure of proof, but instead made it sound as if
her breast augmentation surgery were a sop to her vanity rather than a necessary
part of reassigning her gender.241 Relying on suggestions in the contemporaneous
documentation that suggested that O’Donnabhain’s breasts—“‘approximately B
cup breasts with a very nice shape’”—were within “a normal range of
appearance,” Judge Gale concluded that the breast augmentation surgery fell
within the statutory definition of nondeductible cosmetic surgery because it
“merely improved her appearance.”242 This only puts further distance between
Judge Gale and O’Donnabhain and lends the majority’s split decision a
Solomonic air no doubt intended to detract from the dissenters’ accusations of
judicial activism.
Delving more deeply, it becomes clear that the price of even this partial victory
is quite dear. The Tax Court majority holds O’Donnabhain at arm’s length even
while nominally siding with her. Perhaps Judge Gale keeps his distance from
O’Donnabhain in an effort to rob the dissenters’ accusations of judicial activism
of their force. That may explain why Judge Gale largely speaks of GID in abstract
terms rather than grounding his discussion in the experience of the taxpayer who
has claimed expenses for the treatment of GID. That does not, however, explain
why, on the few occasions when Judge Gale does address O’Donnabhain’s
experience of GID, he downplays that experience by avoiding the language
employed by O’Donnabhain and her doctors and replacing it with his own
account that minimizes her suffering. Whatever the reason for this distancing and
displacement, O’Donnabhain’s victory comes at the cost of debasing her
humanity.
The dissenters multiply these costs by openly denigrating O’Donnabhain.
They grudgingly refer to her in the feminine, label her deluded, and imply that
she would have been better served undergoing psychotherapy to address her
delusion rather than undergoing surgery that mutilated her perfectly healthy male
body. Thus, the dissenters also displace O’Donnabhain’s subjectivity with their
own—but this time, rather than merely recapitulating her experience in a
diminished form, they replace it outright with their own preconceived notions
contain the very possibility of a secret that hides and reveals itself at the same time within a single
sentence and, more than that, within a single language.”).
241. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 77-78 (Halpern, J., concurring).
242. Id. at 72-73 (majority opinion) (quoting testimony of Dr. Meltzer).
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about transgender persons. This displacement comes no more clearly than when
Judge Gustafson openly refuses to respect O’Donnabhain’s self-perception
regarding her gender and employs both feminine and masculine pronouns to refer
to O’Donnabhain, depending on whether the reference relates to the period
before or after her sex reassignment surgery.
Though they accuse the majority of judicial activism in reaching a decision in
favor of partial deductibility for O’Donnabhain’s expenses, it is the dissenters
themselves who drag this case squarely into the so-called culture war by making
up arguments out of whole cloth. Unfortunately, this battle between reactionaries
and the LGBT community plays out—however figuratively—on O’Donnabhain’s
body, as it is laid bare, cut apart, and disfigured by the dissenters’ very words.243
She emerges from this skirmish with a tax victory, but covered with wounds more
literal than literary.
For the LGBT community, the lesson from O’Donnabhain’s experience is that
the Tax Court is hostile to their claims and to them personally. As explained
above,244 the Tax Court’s treatment of LGBT taxpayers in other cases only serves
to reinforce this message.245 The Tax Court’s hostility to LGBT taxpayers further
reinforces the ubiquitous hostility toward them found in the Internal Revenue
Code, which “encourages gay and lesbian couples not to file returns or statements
with the IRS that connect one partner with the other. If they dare to do otherwise,
they expose themselves to a panoply of civil and criminal penalties, and, for those
in the closet, to the public outing that tax litigation would necessarily entail
(should they choose to fight the IRS’s determination in court). The Code thus
attempts to banish [same-sex] relationships from sight, making [lesbians and gay
men] invisible once again.”246
2. Damage to the Tax System
On the surface, the tax system—to the extent that it aims to raise revenue—
emerges having lost revenue, but not as much as it could have. The Tax Court’s
243. See id. at 109 (Gustafson, J., concurring and dissenting) (“[H]e paid a surgeon about $20,000 to
remove his genitals, fashion simulated female genitals, and insert breast implants. After these procedures,
petitioner ‘passed’ as female and became happier.”).
244. See supra Part II.
245. Even though the Tax Court is an Article I court with specialized jurisdiction, I.R.C. § 7441 (West,
Westlaw through P.L. 112-90), its treatment of LGBT taxpayers appears to differ little from that of the
generalist Article III courts. A recent empirical study of appellate decisions found that state courts are
more receptive to the claims of LGBT litigants than are federal courts. DANIEL R. PINELLO, GAY RIGHTS
AND AMERICAN LAW 105-17, 145-46 (2003). Indeed, one commentator has gone so far as to recapitulate
the major conclusion of that study as: “federal courts not only were less receptive than state courts to gay
rights claims, but that they were systemically hostile.” Nan D. Hunter, Federal Courts, State Courts, and
Civil Rights: Judicial Power and Politics, 92 GEO. L.J. 941, 942 (2004) (reviewing PINELLO, supra). (It is
worth noting that Hunter critiques Pinello’s study in her review on both methodological and theoretical
grounds.)
246. Infanti, Sodomy Statute, supra note 97, at 803.
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decision to allow O’Donnabhain a deduction for the bulk of her expenses247—
namely, those for sex reassignment surgery and hormone therapy—represents a
revenue loss. But the denial of a portion of her claimed expenses—namely, those
relating to her breast augmentation surgery—represents a revenue gain, espe-
cially if one adopts Judge Halpern’s position that the denial of this deduction was
solely due to a lack of proof.248 The largest revenue loss came not from the Tax
Court’s decision on the merits of O’Donnabhain’s claim for a medical expense
deduction, but in the Tax Court’s later order that the federal government
reimburse O’Donnabhain $250,000 for her litigation costs.249
Again, delving more deeply, the wounds to the tax system extend far beyond
what is, in the broader budgetary context, a minuscule loss of revenue. This case
strips the tax law of its mantle of exceptionalism. Far from being dragged down
from its place above the fray, as Judge Holmes laments, the sharply divided Tax
Court in O’Donnabhain merely reveals tax law for what it is, namely, a highly
contested political terrain.
Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah has observed that tax academics seem to have a
particularly difficult time acknowledging even the most obvious and mundane
way in which tax is political. Speaking of the cyclical nature of the tax laws and
giving examples of how the current treatment of dividends and capital gains are
merely a return to the way in which they were treated in earlier eras, Professor
Avi-Yonah asserts:
Tax academics may dismiss this as “just politics” interfering with the
desirable progress toward the ideal tax system. But of course, at its
heart taxation is all about politics—it is about the relationship between
citizens and the state, and about the proper size of the public sector.
These are properly the most contested political issues, which come up
in every election. To pretend that there is a pure tax science that
constantly progresses and that can be separated from these questions is
to ignore reality.250
Here, Professor Avi-Yonah is really speaking not about the tax system itself, but
about the amount of revenue raised by that system. Professor Avi-Yonah is
correct that tax is political in the sense that how much revenue we raise through
taxation bears on (though is far from determinative of) the question of how large
government ought to be. Yet, once they decide how much revenue to raise,
politicians have at their disposal a number of different tax instruments to
accomplish the goal of raising the desired amount of revenue.
247. The cost of the (nondeductible) breast augmentation surgery was $4,500, while the total expenses
at issue were more than $21,000. O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 41-42 (majority opinion).
248. Id. at 77-78 (Halpern, J., concurring).
249. Order of Decision, O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, No. 6402-06 (T.C. Nov. 9, 2010).
250. Avi-Yonah, supra note 239, at 2235.
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Tax is thus political not only at the level of determining how much revenue to
raise, but also at the level of determining how that revenue is raised. Indeed, this
is one of the key insights of critical tax theory.251 Consciously or unconsciously,
deliberately or reflexively, those who have created and administer our tax system
have politicized the collection of revenue by extending into the tax laws—and
then entrenching and reinforcing there—the subordination along lines of race,
ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, class, and disability that is pervasive in our
society. That pervasive prejudices are pervasively present in the law should not
be surprising. It is only surprising to those who embrace the notion that tax is
somehow exceptional and who, as a result, falsely believe that the highly
charged, endlessly contested topic of taxation is nonetheless above the political
fray.252
The sharply divided Tax Court in O’Donnabhain put a deep crack in the lenses
of the rose-colored glasses worn by tax exceptionalists both inside and outside of
academe. It stretches credulity to argue that tax is somehow above the political
fray after reading the opinions in this case. The Tax Court majority appears to
have distanced itself from the taxpayer—eschewing the demonstrations of
empathy encountered in other tax cases involving the boundaries of the medical
expense deduction—at least in part, it seems, to fend off accusations of judicial
activism. The band of dissenters, who nonetheless sling accusations of judicial
activism at the majority, are themselves openly—and simultaneously—activist
and reactionary. They go out of their way to make additional arguments on behalf
of the government, whose briefs are already bloated and larded with every
plausible (and implausible) argument that could be made. In the process, the
dissenting Tax Court judges torture both language and law to reach their desired
result, while chastising the government for not doing the same. How we impose
taxes and administer our tax system simply does not get any more political than
that.
Often, the workings of subordination are subtle and insidious. Through control
of the flow of ideas in society—what Antonio Gramsci has labeled “hegemony”—
the dominant group in a society is able to retain and solidify their position
through a form of domination that is “often subtle, invisible, and consensual.”253
Though I have provided a fuller description of Gramsci’s conceptualization of
hegemony elsewhere,254 this short recapitulation of the concept nicely highlights
its relevance to my point here:
By hegemony Gramsci meant the permeation throughout civil society—
including a whole range of structures and activities like trade unions,
251. Anthony C. Infanti & Bridget J. Crawford, Introduction to CRITICAL TAX THEORY, supra note
220, at xxi.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 86-96.
253. Douglas Litowitz, Gramsci, Hegemony, and the Law, 2000 BYU L. REV. 515, 519.
254. Infanti, supra note 96, at 1242-49.
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schools, the churches, and the family—of an entire system of values,
attitudes, beliefs, morality, etc. that is in one way or another supportive
of the established order and the class interests that dominate it.
Hegemony in this sense might be defined as an “organizing principle”,
or world-view (or combination of such world-views), that is diffused
by agencies of ideological control and socialization into every area of
daily life. To the extent that this prevailing consciousness is internal-
ized by the broad masses, it becomes part of “common sense”; as all
ruling elites seek to perpetuate their power, wealth, and status, they
necessarily attempt to popularize their own philosophy, culture,
morality, etc. and render them unchallengeable, part of the natural
order of things.255
With the “organizing principle,” “world-view,” and “common sense” of a
society shaped by its needs and wants, the dominant group in society finds little
need for its subordination of others to be blatant or overt. Indeed, it is to the
dominant group’s great benefit and advantage that many who are subordinated
unquestioningly accept their subordination as part of the natural order of things.
For this very reason, however, it is remarkable to see O’Donnabhain’s subordina-
tion lurking not below the surface as some subtle subtext of the Tax Court’s
decision but being fully on public display.256 O’Donnabhain’s case has inflicted
damage on the tax system and the apparatuses for its enforcement by undermin-
ing their image as a neutral mechanism for collecting revenue. Instead, her case
reveals tax rules—and the manner in which authority figures interpret and apply
those rules—as challengeable, fallible, and actively working to subordinate those
not in the dominant group of society.
CONCLUSION
“Intersectionality.” In legal academic circles, we toss this term about in as
carefree a fashion as the students at my university toss Frisbees on the lawn
behind the Cathedral of Learning on warm spring days.257 Though these students
are marking their collective joy that the weather has finally begun to warm and
that another year in their academic journey is nearly complete, we cannot lose
sight of the fact that the ease with which we speak of intersectionality stems not
from joy but from repetition—an unthinking repetition that masks a profoundly
255. CARL BOGGS, GRAMSCI’S MARXISM 39 (1976).
256. In this regard, O’Donnabhain’s Tax Court case received much more attention than the typical tax
dispute. E.g., Court Rules Sex-Change Costs Are Tax-Deductible, KETK (Feb. 3, 2010, 11:32 AM),
http://www.ketknbc.com/news/court-rules-sex-change-costs-are-tax-deductible (last updated Apr. 3, 2011);
Ryan J. Donmoyer, Sex-Change Costs Are Tax-Deductible, U.S. Court Rules, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 3, 2010,
2:47 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pidnewsarchive&sidaqACvUSEeas4; William Sale-
tan, Trans Figure: Should Sex-Change Surgery Be Tax-Deductible, SLATE (Feb. 16, 2010, 8:15 AM),
http://www.slate.com/id/2244817/.
257. On March 5, 2011, I performed a search for the word “intersectionality” in the “US Law Reviews
and Journals, Combined” database on LEXIS, which returned more than 1,500 hits.
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violent phenomenon.
In our short (and, I expect) disturbing time together today, we have removed
this and other masks. We have borne witness as the originary violence attendant
to the damaging collision of tax with sexual and gender identity carves out an
intersection that will provide the opportunity for these two “others” to collide
again and again in the future. Yet, despite being “others” of quite different and
ostensibly incompatible sorts, we have also seen that tax and sexual and gender
identity share in common both their outsider status and a set of severe wounds
inflicted by the intersection of their paths. Much as we all understand that
redressing discrimination and subordination can be a painful and difficult
process, I hope that, by refusing to avert our gaze from the originary,
intersectional violence of this collision, we will all have come to more clearly
understand that merely acknowledging the existence of discrimination and
subordination can be equally painful and difficult—and that we all suffer
whenever any one of us is the victim of discrimination or subordination.
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